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THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO
CONCLUDE INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
CRAIG MATHEWS'
OxE of the most important constitutional issues of recent times is the extent
to which the Constitution confers upon the President independent authority
to conclude international agreements.' As the exigencies of foreign relations
impose continually increasing burdens upon those who shape our international
policies, this problem assumes an ever greater significance. The recent and
evidently unfinished controversy regarding the proposed Bricker Amendment
indicates in dramatic terms an awareness both of the immediacy of the question
and of the underlying policies which are at stake.2
The many attempts to resolve this problem have made it clear that no answer
is sufficient which does not recognize the primary importance of an effective
foreign policy in the contemporary world. It need not be demonstrated how
little this world resembles that of the men who drafted the Constitution nearly
two centuries ago. We face, as much as they, the necessity of achieving co-
herent national policy, representative of the national interest and responsible
to other nation-states, without in the process sacrificing individual liberties and
democratic methods to authoritarian expediency. Our solution, like theirs,
must inevitably take the form of compromise. But the solution which will be
found adequate today must be based upon the requirements of survival as a
democratic body politic in the contemporary international arena, not that of
1787.3
1 lMember, Ohio Bar.
1. The ambiguity in the phrases "to conclude international agreements" and "to
make international agreements" is recognized. For greatest clarity it is often necessary
to analyze the making of international agreements as a series of functional steps, such as:
(a) formulation of policies; (b) conduct of negotiations; (c) validation of the agreement
as the internal law of the land; and (d) final utterance or ratification of the agreement
as an international obligation. See McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congrcssional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangcable Instrumcnts of National Policy,
54 YALE L.J. 181, 202 (1945). The context below will make clear the sense in which these
phrases are used.
2. For discussion of the Bricker Amendment and collection of the literature, see
Bricker & Webb, Treaty Law vs. Donestic Constitutional Law, 29 NoTa= DAuE LAw. 529
(1954); MacChesney, The Fallacies in the Case for the Bricker Amendment, 29 XoM.
DAxm LAW. 551 (1954) ; Perlman, On Amending the Treaty Power, 52 COL. L Rxv. ,25
(1952).
3. For this reason alone, quite apart from the question of the intent of the founding
fathers, it is dangerous to seek to judge the scope of presidential foreign affairs power
today by the practice of nations two centuries ago. For an extreme example of this
approach, see Fraser, The Constitutional Scope of Treaties and Executive Agremcnts,
31 A.B.A.J. 286 (1945). The author concedes a narrow constitutional authority in the
President to make agreements under his "diplomatic' and Commander in Chief powers,
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Any study of this subject must be largely a history of our practice in the
making of international agreements; there is very little "case law," for the
problems posed by these agreements rarely reach the courts. The relevant
practice demonstrates a long-continued recognition by all branches of the gov-
ernment of the broad scope of the President's powers in foreign relations. It
shows also that in times of crisis the scope of presidential powers must be
broader than in less critical periods ;4 and that this concession of power has
never been regarded as incompatible with the preservation of a democratic
government. A study of prior practice will indicate what the pressures of
foreign relations have demanded and what common consensus has authorized
from our agreement-making processes in the past. This data, together with a
projection of probable future exigencies, is the most realistic gauge available
of the desirable scope of these presidential powers.
Traditionally, the conclusion of international agreements has constituted
one of the most important techniques, indispensable to the general conduct
of diplomacy, by which the executive has sought to make the nation's foreign
policy effective. The President's authority to make such agreements has con-
sequently been regarded as co-extensive with his powers generally in the field
of foreign affairs. It will accordingly be necessary to outline in detail these
various substantive powers. It is these powers which define and limit the
scope of the President's competence to make agreements.
The nature of the President's foreign affairs power is not fully indicated by
a superficial reading of the Constitution. Various conflicting grants of power
and admits that it may, unhappily, be too late to curb a few other varieties of presidential
agreements commonly (although, one gathers, unconstitutionally) entered into in the
past. As to all other international agreements, he concludes that, "where no rational
doubt exists as to the fact that their subject matter is of the general type embodied in
treaty form in the eighteenth century," they can still be undertaken only as treaties,
Id. at 288.
4. Experience demonstrates "a recurring pattern of strong executive authority in war,
followed by a strong counter-assertion of legislative authority." CzaEVER & HAVILAND,
AmERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SEPARATION OF PowERs 6 (1952). A dramatic
illustration is found in the actions of President Lincoln during the critical days of the
Civil War. His most extreme proclamation subjected civilians accused of disloyalty to
trial by military commission even in areas where the regular courts were still properly
functioning. The Supreme Court took refuge in technicality to avoid the necessity of
holding the President's action unconstitutional while the war was actually in progress.
See Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. (68 U.S.) 243 (1864). Not until a year after the
emergency was past did the Court declare, in Ex parle Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866),
that the President could never constitutionally have possessed the power which it in effect
had permitted him to exercise during the period of crisis. See RossirzT, TiE SurtEME
COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 26-39 (1951). See also the cases arising out of
the evacuation (in effect ratified by Congress) of Japanese-Americans from the West
Coast during World War II, particularly Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). Even the various opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952), seem to indicate that, in the absence of explicit congressional prohibi-
tion, a majority of the Court believed that the President might validly have seized the
mills in question if the emergency had been sufficiently great. See Frank, The Fulurc of
Presidential Seizure, Fortune, July, 1952, p. 70.
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to act in the international arena are made to the several branches of the Federal
Government. Thus, Congress has the power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce; to declare war; to provide, maintain, and regulate the armed ser-
vices; to exercise the taxing power in order to provide for the common defense
and general welfare; and to implement, through the necessary and proper
clause, all the powers possessed by the national government.5 Similarly, Article
II of the Constitution confers upon the President several powers essential to
the conduct of foreign affairs: He is authorized to receive representatives from
foreign governments,6 to nominate representatives to foreign governments,
and to make treaties in conjunction with two-thirds of the Senate.7 And far
broader powers accrue to him as Commander in Chief,8 as Chief Executive 0
and under his obligation to see that the laws are faithfully executed.10 Finally,
Article II, section 2 grants to the Senate the power to approve or disapprove
all treaties submitted to it by the President. Even a casual reading of these
provisions indicates the extent to which, in any particular set of circumstances,
they are likely to come in conflict. History bears out this impression. One of
the best-known commentators has said:
"What the Constitution does, and all that it does, is to confer upon the
President certain powers capable of affecting our foreign relations, and
certain other powers of the same general nature upon the Senate, and
still other such powers upon Congress; but which of these organs shall
have the decisive and final voice in determining the course of the American
nation is left for events to resolve .... [T] he Constitution, considered only
for its affirmative grants of power which are capable of affecting the issue,
is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign
policy."1'
Imperative national policy, and not logical derivations from incompatible
grants of authority, has allocated and must continue to allocate the foreign
affairs power among the branches of government. Constitutional language has
been and must be construed in a manner which will promote the major pur-
poses of the Constitution in particular contexts of crisis. It is as futile to
attempt to extract logical consistency from the literal provisions of the Consti-
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. Other powers of less obvious utility have frequently
been employed in foreign affairs: for e.xample, Congressiunal power to establish post
offices, id. art. I, § 8, has been used to conclude agreements regarding international regu-
lation of the mails.
6. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
7. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cd. 2.
8. U.S. Cosr. art. II, §2, c. 1.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
10. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 3.
11. CowixN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFicE AND PowERS 200 (2d ed. 1941). See also Pr-(: r
PREPARED FOR THE JOINT COMITTEE CONSISTING OF THE COMMITTEE o FoM: RuA-
TIONS AND THE COMMITTEE ON ARmED SERvIcES OF THE SENATE, PowERns OF THE Parsi-
DENT TO SEND THE AiMEo FoRcas OUTSIDE THE UNmo STs, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4
(committee print, Feb. 28, 1951) (hereafter cited as REPORT oN: PowErs OF THE PESt-
DENT).
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tution as it is dangerous to over-emphasize the powers of one branch of the gov-
ernment at the expense of another.
The obvious necessity that the national government possess powers adequate
to meet the demands of international relations has resulted in the development-
perhaps by those who have feared without sufficient reason that the express
and implied constitutional grants of power are inadequate-of the doctrine of
"inherent powers" of the national Government to act in foreign affairs. These
powers are said to be the automatic and necessary consequence of sovereign
status in the community of nations; they are "inherently inseparable from the
conception of nationality,"'1 2 "an attribute of sovereignty."' 3 The historical deri-
vation of this comprehensive national power has been disputed. This debate
had its origin in the ancient case of Penhallow v. Doane,14 in which Justices
Iredell and Patterson found themselves in disagreement whether this power
originated in the several states, and passed to the national government upon
ratification of the Constitution, or whether it was received by the national
Government directly from the Continental Congress without ever having been
possessed by the states. In 1936 the Supreme Court gave approval to the
latter position in a dictum which has been the subject of considerable contro-
versy.' 5 Whatever the merits of this controversy, the same exigencies of
national policy which have occasioned the growth of this doctrine also require
recognition of the need for adequate presidential powers in those areas of
foreign affairs in which only the executive is capable of acting with the prompt-
ness and singleness of purpose essential in times of crisis.
It is apparent that considerations of policy underlie these abstract arguments.
Theories of "inherent powers" and of a mystic transmigration of the national
foreign affairs power from Crown to Federal Government, supported by the
rationalization that "sovereignty is never held in suspense,"10 appear unduly
metaphysical today. But they reflect an awareness, even of the metaphysicians,
that one of the major purposes of our Constitution is national survival in the
world arena.
"Whatever the rationale used, it is perfectly clear that in the conduct
of our international relations, the powers of the Federal Government are
ample to deal with any problem, because they derive not only from the
Constitution, but 'from the necessities of the case.' ,,17
12. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). Also
see CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWzRS 202 (2d ed. 1941).
13. 1 BuTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1902). See
also CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 202 (2d ed. 1941). Contra, TucKER,
LImITATIONS ON THE TREATY-MAKING POWER 98-105 (1915).
14. 3 Dall. (3 U.S.) 54 (1795).
15. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936)
(dictum).
16. Id. at 317.
17. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidentlial Agree-
ments: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 260 (1945). See
also CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PoWERs 201. (2d ed. 1941).
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A brief glance at the relevant history indicates the dominant role that neces-
sity has played in distributing the foreign affairs power among the branches of
the national Government. The Presidency has possessed from the beginning
inherent practical advantages which have enabled it to assume a large share
of control over the foreign policy of the United States. Because the executive
is relatively unified it is able to act more swiftly than a legislature divided in
opinion. The President is in a position, as Congress is not, to keep negotiations
and decisions secret at need. He possesses generally more adequate sources of
information than does Congress in foreign matters. And he is always ready
to act, unlike the legislature, which may be in recess or incapacitated by the
parliamentary complications of other business.' 8 It is not surprising, therefore,
that the President has become recognized as the leader of the nation in the
conduct of its foreign affairs. The constitutional clause providing for the
"Advice and Consent" of the Senate in making treaties 21 has gradually come
to mean no more than that the Senate retains a power of veto or amendment
of the treaties negotiated by the President. As a matter of politics the Presi-
dent may still consult influential Senators or special committees, but the Senate
as a body no longer fills the role of advisor, if indeed it ever did. -0 The Presi-
dent has further developed the possibilities of avoiding a veto by a minority
third of the Senate through increased use of his power to make international
agreements independently and by combining his powers with those of the
whole Congress.2 1 As a result, in recent years there has been a great decline
in the number of treaties relative to the number of presidential and congres-
sional-executive agreements. 22 There has been no dispute that the President has
certain constitutional powers not subject to the will of Congress or the Senate.
And ever since the famous debate between Pacificus and Helvidius it has been
For a recent discussion of the practical considerations which have required that the
President take the lead in initiating foreign policy, see Acheson, Responsibilvty for De-
cision in Foreign Policy, 44 YALE Ray. 1 (1954).
18. CoRWi , THE PREsnrENr: OFFICE AND Powr.s 200 (2d ed. 1941), citing TUE
FEDFALisT, No. 64 (Jay).
19. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
20. See Coawix, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowEas 232-34 (2d ed. 1941).
21. For a general discussion of congressional-executive agreements, see McDougal
& Lans, supra note 17. Employment of this technique has been frequent. Texas was
annexed in 1845 by joint resolution of Congress assented to by the President, after the
Senate had defeated a treaty for this purpose. The same method was used to by-pass
the treaty power in the annexation of Haiwaii in 1898, and arguably would have been used
also in the case of the Philippines if the Senate had, as it threatened, eliminated the
annexation provision in the Treaty of Paris. Thus also the first World War was termi-
nated in 1921 by joint resolution after the Senate had defeated the Treaty of Versailles.
And in 1934 the United States by joint resolution was enabled to join the International
Labor Organization, although the defeat of the Treaty of Versailles had prevented mem-
bership previously.
22. See e.g., Wright, The United States and Inlernational Agreemenls, 38 Amx. J.
INT'L L. 341, 345 (1944); Borchard, Editorial Comment, 39 A.M. J. I.xf'L L. 537, 539
(1945).
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generally accepted that the opening sentence of Article II, conferring upon
the President the "executive power," is not declaratory merely, but makes an
affirmative grant of power.23 Similarly, no one has questioned that Congress
may authorize the President, as its agent, to take action in foreign affairs
which would be beyond the reach of his own unaided powers. Although the
outer limits of this power have never been drawn, it has been argued with
reason that the combined powers of Congress and the President are plenary.24
In the field of foreign, as contrasted with domestic, affairs it is accepted that
the scope of permissible delegation of congressional authority is very broad:
"Practically every volume of United States statutes contains one or more
acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President
in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either leave the
exercise of the power to his unrestricted judgment, or provide a standard
far more general than that which has always been considered requisite
with regard to domestic affairs. '25
The justification for a broad delegation is generally found in the concept of
"cognate powers," which was created by the Supreme Court to distinguish a
delegation of domestic power from one of foreign power: the latter "confided
to the President . . . an authority which was cognate to the conduct by him
of the foreign relations of the Government. '26 The premise upon which this
doctrine is founded is that the President himself has broad independent powers.
Thus, as an inevitable consequence of participation and survival in the world
arena, broad executive authority to undertake international agreements has
consistently been recognized.2 7 And, in the agreement making process the
amount of participation by the President and Congress has increased relative
to that of the Senate. Recent debate has focused upon whether the treaty-
making procedure can be totally by-passed through the combined powers of
Congress and the President. But more fundamental and more difficult ques-
tions are raised by the relationship between the President and Congress: first,
what is the scope of the President's agreement power when he acts without
the authorization of Congress or the Senate; and second, to what extent can
Congress constitutionally limit the President in the exercise of this power?
23. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 22-23 (1944). The dis-
pute was between Hamilton and Madison.
24. McDougal & Lans, mspra note 17, passim.
25. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 324 (1936).
26. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 422 (1935). Accord, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327 (1936); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892) ; United States v. Boreno, 50 F. Supp. 520, 523-24 (D. Md. 1943) ; CoRwIN, THE
CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION 23-24 (1944).
27. "On the whole, therefore, the net result of a century and a quarter of contest
for power and influence in determining the international destinies of the country remains
decisively and conspicuously in favor of the President." CORWIN, TnE PRESIDENTS CON-




SCOPE OF PRESIDENT'S INDEPENDENT POWER TO MAxE AGREEMENTS
Nowhere in the Constitution can there be found an explicit provision grant-
ing to the President the power to conclude international agreements without
the sanction of Congress or the Senate. Yet this power has been exercised
consistently since the beginning of our history. And in the process, the Presi-
dent has acquired the exclusive right to negoliatc all agreements with foreign
nations, including those concluded as treaties?8 The President's authority to
enter an agreement which becomes an international obligation of the United
States is so indispensable to his power to initiate foreign policy that it may
reasonably be derived by implication from the language of the Constitution.
Article , section 10, which states that "No State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation" and that "No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power," indicates that the Constitution itself recognizes the
existence of international agreements other than treaties.20 Since power to
make these agreements was accorded to the states with congressional consent,
it would be difficult to conclude, and has never been concluded, that this power
was denied to the Federal Government.3 0 And, in order to prevent his sub-
stantive powers under Article II from being in large measure ineffectual, the
President must share in this federal power. Moved by practical considerations,
and fortified by inferences from constitutional language, the courts have recog-
nized that the President does possess this power in the few cases where the
question has arisen.31 And the Congress has similarly, since the beginning of
our history, accepted his exercise of such power.
The question which remains unanswered today concerns not the existence
but the scope of the President's independent power to conclude international
agreements. In the absence of a clause in the Constitution explicitly granting
and limiting the power, its boundaries must be discovered by determining the
scope of the substantive foreign affairs powers of the President; for his
authority to make international agreements must be coextensive with these
substantive powers if he is not to be deprived of a frequently indispensable
instrument for exercising them.
Plainly, the specific grants of power to the President in Article II, together
28. "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate, and mani-
fold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative
of the Nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but lie alone
negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it." United States v. Curtiss-Wright F_-port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936).
29. See Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive Agrcontents, and Importcd
Potatoes, 67 Ha'. L. REv. 281, 287 (1953).
30. See McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YAE I.J. 181, 221
(1945).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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with powers which arise by implication from them, afford one source of sub-
stantive authority. There may also be said to reside in the President an "in-
herent" power to make decisions in foreign affairs comparable to that possessed
by the national Government as a whole.3 2 To a degree, the structure of the Con-
stitution supports the existence of inherent presidential powers: while the con-
stitutional provisions conferring power on Congress in the field of foreign affairs
are explicitly stated and limited, those defining the powers of the President are
much more broadly drawn.33 The so-called "stewardship theory" of Theodore
Roosevelt is close to this concept in supposing that the executive power of the
President is limited only by specific restrictions contained in the Constitution
or capable of being imposed by Congress under its own constitutional powers. 4
Abstract theorizing about "inherent" or "implied" powers will not, however,
aid in resolving the conflict between a literal interpretation of the Constitution
and the exigencies of our foreign relations. The best indication of where the
line of compromise must be drawn in an increasingly difficult future can be found
by charting the areas to which the power of the President has consistently been
recognized to extend in the past.
Power of the President as Commander in Chicf
Probably the most important, and certainly the most dramatic, of all presi-
dential powers is that which derives from his authority as Commander in Chief
of the armed forces. Here "the Constitution confers upon the Executive his most
formidable power with respect to the external relations of the country."80t
This power has been manifested in many ways, through different techniques,
prominent among which is the independent conclusion of international agree-
ments.
The power to make peace, although often regarded is an exclusive prerogative
of the treaty-making procedure, was in fact exercised by the President alone to
terminate the Civil War.30 No President has attempted to conclude a foreign
war by proclamation, and the opinion was expressed by one President that this
32. "[T]he courts have recognized that the President . . .has certain powers in the
field of foreign affairs which are not conferred expressly by the Constitution but are
derived from the fact that the United States is a sovereign nation, with rights and obliga-
tions under the law of nations." REPORT ON POWERS OF THE PRE SIDENT 1.
33. See id. at 6.
34. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowERs 131 (2d ed. 1941). The
Steel Seizure case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)) sheds
little light on this question. One of the arguments apparently made by the Government
to support the seizure was its "inherent power ... supported by the Constitution, by
historical precedent and by court decisions." Id. at 584. It is not clear, however, whether
this argument relied upon the doctrine of inherent powers in its technical sense: in
summarizing the Government's position, the Court made reference merely to the distinction
between "express" and "implied" powers. Id. at 587. The term "inherent" may have been
used only in the latter sense.
35. 'MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL ExEcuTivE AGREEMENTS 321 (1941).




action would be beyond his powers.3 7 Certainly there are political considerations
which normally would cause a President to hesitate long before testing this
power. But the conclusion of an agreement of peace is one technique by which
the exercise of military force may be terminated, and as such it can perhaps be
regarded as a natural incident of the President's power as Commander in Chief.
An attempt to make peace by agreement would be less radical than at first it
seems, for the power to make peace appears in reality to be a composite of a
variety of other powers, most of which the President has exercised. Further-
more, it is certain that the President has power to conclude agreements prepara-
tory to the drafting of peace treaties, as for example the Moscow Agreement of
December 1945, dealing with the preparation of treaties with Italy, Finland,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, establishing a Far Eastern Commission and
Allied Council for Japan, and providing for the reestablishment of Korea as an
independent state.3 s And finally, the Supreme Court has stated that war may
be terminated by various methods, including "Presidential proclamation."39
On several occasions the President has exercised his authority as Commander
in Chief to make international arrangements regarding the control of military
equipment and resources. By multilateral agreement in 1945 the United States
joined other governments both in approving the retention of international con-
trol over the merchant shipping of the signatory nations for as long after World
War II as might prove necessary, and in establishing an international authority
to regulate the use of this shipping.40 Similarly, in 1945 the United States,
Canada, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement signed at Washing-
ton, affirming the desirability of exchanging information regarding the use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and recommending the establishment of a
United Nations commission to study the means of controlling it in war."' To a
like effect was the secret 1943 agreement between the United States and Great
Britain regarding military and industrial use of atomic energy.
A familiar exercise of the Commander in Chief power has been the conclusion
of armistice agreements with defeated enemies. Perhaps the first use of this
power vas the agreement terminating the Spanish-American War. 2 During
World War II a number of armistice and similar agreements were concluded
by the President. The Commander in Chief clause was the constitutional
37. This President was Vilson. Id. at 79 & n.23.
38. Moscow Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 STAT. 1899, T.I.A.S. No. 1555.
39. Ludecke v. 'Watldns, 335 U.S. 169, 16S-69 (1948) (dictum).
40. Principles Having Reference to Continuance of Coordinated Control, Aug. 5, 1944,
T.I.A.S. No. 172Z
41. Atomic Energy: Agreed Declaration, Nov. 15, 1945,60 STAr. 1479 (1946), T.I.A.S.
No. 1504.
42. This agreement by virtue of its provisions for the relinquishment of Spanish
claims to Cuba and for the cession of Puerto Rico by Spain to the United States came
near to fulfilling the function of a treaty of peace. BERDAHL, WAR POWE.S Or 'in. .'-
-nyE IN THE UNIr=t STATzS 234 (1920). It also supports the propositiun that the Com-
mander in Chief may presently possess most of the powers necessary to conclude tr#tk,
of peace in the unlikely event that it should ever become necessary.
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basis for American participation in the agreement concluded by the United Na-
tions approving the principles of the Atlantic Charter and pledging the signatory
nations not to conclude separate armistice agreements with the enemy. 48 In
accordance with this agreement, the Allied Commander in Chief presented to
Italy in 1943 44 the armistice agreement which was operative until terminated
by the Treaty of Peace signed in Paris in 1947.45 So also the Allied Supreme
Commanders accepted the German surrender 40 and the surrender of Japan.4t
The most recent exercise of this power is, of course, the conclusion of the
armistice in Korea.48
Under the Commander in Chief power the President has repeatedly made
international agreements regarding the administration of liberated or conquered
territory in the aftermath of war. A recent agreement restored liberated Nor-
wegian territory to the control of the Norwegian Government as rapidly as
possible consistent with the military needs of the Allied forces. 49 World War II
also provides numerous examples of agreements concluded by the President re-
garding the control of conquered territory.50 Thus at Berlin in June 1945,
the United States joined with Russia, the United Kingdom, and the Provisional
Government of France in a general agreement with respect to the defeat of
Germany and the assumption of control over occupied German territory.51
Four years later the tripartite administration of Western Germany was ter-
minated by an agreement which merged the three Western Zones, established
the High Commission for Germany, and drafted the Occupation Statute to
serve as fundamental law for the Western Zone.52 And economic integration
43. Cooperative War Effort, Jan. 1, 1942, 55 STAT. 1600, E.A.S. No. 236.
44. Armistice With Italy, Sep. 3, 1943, 61 STAT. 2740 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1604.
45. Peace Treaty With Italy, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 STAT. 1245, T.I.A.S. No. 1648; Armi-
stice with Rumania, Sept. 12, 1944, 59 STAT. 1712 (1945), E.A.S. No. 490; Armistice
With Bulgaria, Oct. 28, 1944, 58 STAT. 1498, E.A.S. No. 437; Armistice With Hungary,
Jan. 20, 1945, 59 STAT. 1321, E.A.S. No. 456.
46. German Surrender Agreement, May 7, 1945, 59 STAT. 1857, E.A.S. No. 502.
47. Japan Surrender Agreement, Sept. 2, 1945, 59 STAT. 1733, E.A.S. No. 493.
48. Korean Armistice Declaration, July 27, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2782.
49. Restoration of Norwegian Territory Agreement, May 16, 1944, T.I.A.S. No. 1514.
50. For a brief discussion indicating that the President's broad and almost exclusive
control over conquered territory has been recognized by the Supreme Court in connection
with earlier wars, see RossiTER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CIIEF,
120-25 (1951).
51. Declaration Regarding Germany, June 5, 1945, 60 STAT. 1649 (1946), T.I.A.S.
No. 1520. At the same time all four powers issued supplementary statements regarding
administrative arrangements for the occupation, the zones agreed to be occupied by each,
and the means established for consultation with the other United Nations.
52. Merger of Three Western German Occupation Zones, Apr. 8, 1949, T.I.A.S. No.
2066. It was in pursuance of this agreement that the Presidebt by executive order estab-
lished the office of United States High Commissioner for Germany. Exec. Order No.
10062, 14 F. R. 2965 (1949).
Similar agreements have dealt with other post war administrative problems. Pro-
visional Administration of Venezia Giulia Agreement, Jun. 9, 1945, 59 STAT. 1855, E.A.S.
No. 501 (including Trieste); Occupation of Austria Agreement, July 9, 1945, 61 STAT.
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of the Western Zones of Germany was the subject of two agreements entered
into by the United States on the sole huthority of the President. A memor-
andum signed by the United States and Great Britain concerned the economic
coordination of the American and British zones ;V3 it was terminated in accord-
ance with its terms by the subsequent merger of the three Western Zones.
The second agreement, effected by an exchange of notes with France in mid-
1947, regulated coal exports from the Western Zones of Germany.rA This
agreement, subject to revision at the end of 1947, was continued informally
until the serious coal shortage in Europe came to an end in 19 4 9 .r Thus,
our experience indicates that the broad power of the Commander in Chief to
administer occupied territory must frequently be exercised through the medium
of Presidential agreements and that power to make effective agreements
continues until the conclusion of a treaty of peace with the government of the
occupied territory.
A famous example of the exercise of the Commander in Chief power is the
agreement concluded in 1817 with Great Britain, limiting armament of the
Great Lakes.56 After six months this agreement was submitted to the Senate
and approved as a treaty. But at the time it was concluded its sole basis appears
to have been the independent power of the President as Commander in Chief.
And even after the Senate acted, a ratification was never made or exchanged
with Great Britain, although an executive ratification is generally recognized
as a prerequisite to the legal effectiveness of a treaty. 7
A common non-military exercise of the President's power as Commander
in Chief is his disposition of financial claims of allied and hostile powers. In
1944, the United States and Great Britain concluded an agreement allocating
damage claims arising out of the war to claims commissions of the two coun-
tries for settlement. 5s The United States and the United Iringdom also ex-
2679 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1600; Reestablishment of Austrian Government Agreement,
June 28, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 2097; Agreement Seating United States Representative on
Central Commission of the Rhine, Oct. 4, 29, & Nov. 5, 1945, 50 STAT. 1932 (1946),
T.I.A.S. No. 1571; Agreement Terminating the Berlin-Blockade, May 4, 1949, T.I.A.S.
No. 1915.
53. Agreement on Fusion of American and British Occupation Zones, Dec. 2, 1946,
61 STAT. 2475 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1575.
54. German Coal Export Agreement, Apr. 19, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 2109.
55. Closely related to the agreements regarding the administration of conquered
territory are those reestablishing normal conditions in foreign nations following war. See,
e.g., European Coal Organization Agreement, Jan. 4, 1946, (60 ST.IT. 1517, T.I.A.S. No.
1503; European Transport Organizations Agreement, Sept. 27, 1945, 59 STAT. 1740, E.A.S.
No. 494, pursuant to prior agreement with regard to the same subject, European Trans-
port Agreement, May 8, 1945, 59 STAT. 1359, E.A.S. No. 458.
56. See H.R. Doc No. 471, 56th Cong., 1st Sess. (1900).
57. See MacDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Execulk , or Presidential
Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALm LJ. 1SI, 209
(1945).
58. Claims Arising From Armed Forces Personnel Acts, Feb. 29 & 'Mar. 28, 1944,
61 STAT. 2728 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1602.
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changed notes regarding the disposition of captured United Nations vessels
recovered during the course of the European liberation.59 And in 1947 the
United States and Czechoslovakia reached agreement concerning the settlement
of claims held by the two countries against each other as a consequence of the
American occupation.60 By a number of presidential agreements the United
States has waived claims it held against other nations. Thus by an exchange
of notes the United States and Canada agreed to waive all claims for damages
arising out of traffic accidents in which government vehicles were involved. 01
In 1946 the United States and Luxemburg mutually agreed to waive certain
claims arising out of the conduct of the war.6 2 And in the following year the
United States and the United Kingdom agreed to "forebear from asserting
claims" against each other for injury to military property or personnel,03
Finally, presidential agreements have been employed to settle reparation claims
against aggressor nations. Thus, following World War II, the United States
by multilateral agreement assented to the allocation scheme for reparation
payments due from Germany and approved the establishment of an Inter-
Allied Reparations Agency.64 Later this country joined France, the United
Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia in establishing a plan for the alloca-
tion of a portion of these reparation payments to aid in rehabilitating certain
non-repatriatable victims of the war.65
Wartime Agreements with Postwar Consequences: Yalta
That the Commander in Chief clause authorizes the President to enter into
agreements necessary to the conduct of a war has never been doubted. Most
of these are concluded by the President's subordinates and are entirely routine
in character. But occasionally an agreement of far-reaching consequences is
59. Agreement on Recaptured Vessels, May 7 & June 15, 1945, 60 STAT. 1909 (1946),
T.I.A.S. No. 1556.
60. Agreement on Claims Incident to Operations of the United States Army in
Czechoslovalda, July 25, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1675.
61. Agreement on Traffic Accidents Involving United States and Canadian Armed
Forces Vehicles, Mar. 1 & 23, 1944, 60 STAT. 1948 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1581. This agree-
ment specifically reserved all private claims. Two years later the United States and
Canada agreed to waive maritime claims. Agreement on Claims Involving United States
and Canadian Vessels, Sept. 28, Nov. 13 & 15, 1946, 61 STAr. 2520 (1947), T.I.A.S.
No. 1582.
62. Agreement on Waiver of Certain Claims Between the United States and
Luxemburg, Sept. 12, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 2067.
63. Agreement Between United States and Great Britain on Claims Resulting From
Armed Forces Personnel Acts, Oct. 23, 1946 & Jan. 23, 1947, 61 STAT. 2876 (1947),
T.I.A.S. No. 1622. This agreement constituted a modification of a prior agreement.
Claims Arising From Armed Forces Personnel Acts, Feb. 29 & Mar. 28, 1944, 61 STAT.
2728 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1602.
64. Agreement on German Reparations, Jan. 14, 1946, 61 STAT. 3157 (1947), T.I.A.S.
No. 1655.
65. Agreement and Allocating Repatriation Payments, June 14, 1946, 61 STAT. 3157
(1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1594.
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made. Such was the Yalta agreement.60 When its terms became known it
precipitated a controversy which continues still. In exchange for an under-
taking by Marshal Stalin that Russia would conclude a pact of friendship with
China and assist that country to extricate itself from Japanese control, and
for his further undertaking that Russia would enter the Pacific War two or
three months after Germany surrendered, the Prime Minister and the Presi-
dent pledged their countries' support to allot to Russia the Kuriles, the south-
ern half of Sakhalin Island, and adjacent islands; to permit Russia to lease
Port Arthur as a naval base; to internationalize the port of Dairen; and to
permit Russia to operate the Manchurian Railroad jointly with China. Where
the interests of China were affected by this agreement, President Roosevelt
agreed to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government
As a wartime military agreement designed to enlist Russia as an ally in the
Pacific Var, no dispute arises regarding the validity of the Yalta agreement.
But its critics see it as more than a wartime military agreement. They argue
that, while valid when formulated as an exercise of the Commander in Chief
power, it should have been submitted to the Senate as a treaty after the war
was over. Alternatively, they maintain that despite its purportedly military
nature, it was in fact of far broader scope, and as such beyond the President's
powers as Commander in Chief. The first criticism is supported by certain
statements made by President Roosevelt at the Yalta meeting and afterwards,
indicating his recognition of the necessity to submit the agreement to the sen-
ate for subsequent approval. 7 And as a political matter it might have been
desirable to obtain Senate approval after secrecy ceased to be of importance.
But since the President purported to bind the United States as of the time
he signed, despite any later collateral statements, failure of the Senate to ap-
prove the agreement would not affect its international validity. More. over. if
the agreement was valid at the time it was entered into, any Senate action
coming after it was made public would have been mere formality, for hy then
many of the concessions were faits accomplis. In this respect the Yalta agree-
ment differs from the secret agreement between Churchill and Roobevwlt
regarding military use of atomic energy. As an agreement of continuing effect,
the latter might have been terminated at any time (as in fact it appears to
have been by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946), so that submission to the
Senate for approval would have been meaningful.
There is somewhat more consistency, though little cogency, in the argument
that the Yalta agreement was invalid ab initio because it was beyond the scope
of the Commander in Chief power. This argument is shored up in several
ways: the extreme informality of the document is alleged to indicate that the
66. Yalta Agreement, Feb. 11, 1945, 59 STAT. 1823, E.A.S. No. 493.
67. For the text of the President's report to Congress on the Yalta meeting and for
Byrnes' account of the President's statement at Yalta, see Par, Legal Aspects of the
Yalta Agreement, 46 Am. J. INr'L L. 40, 43 "(1952), and Briggs, Editorial Comment,
40 Am. J. INT'L L. 376, 380 (1946).
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agreement was intended to be personal to the signatories ;08 a state is supposed
to be unable to make a binding agreement affecting the interests of other states
without their consent; 69 the above-mentioned statements by Roosevelt and
some by Byrnes are said to indicate that the agreement required Senatorial
approval; and the agreement is alleged to violate various prior treaties.10
There would seem to be little merit in the first contention, inasmuch as no
particular formalities are required for an agreement to be binding at interna-
tional law, and there is no indication of an intent that the agreement should
have such limited effect.71 The second argument has no relevance to the ques-
tion of constitutionality; furthermore, President Roosevelt did subsequently
obtain the consent of China, thus apparently satisfying any defect in the agree-
ment as made. The facts on which the third argument is based have never
been made entirely clear; moreover, whatever statements were made by Byrnes
and Roosevelt, they are not necessarily inconsistent with the immediate war-
time validity of the agreement under the Commander in Chief power. The
fourth contention is unpersuasive in view of the fact that there is considerable
support for the proposition that in terms of constitutional law a Presidential
agreement may supersede contrary provisions of prior treaties.1 2
The stronger position would thus seem to be that the agreement made at
Yalta was a valid exercise of the President's power as Commander in Chief.
Insofar as its purpose was to expedite the war in the Pacific it is free from
question. And the various commitments made to Russia, read as subject to
the condition, subsequently satisfied, of obtaining the assent of China, seem
equally permissible. Other Presidential agreements have transferred the owner-
ship of territory: for example, an agreement transferred Puerto Rico to the
United States and deprived Spain of her claim to Cuba.73 Historically, the
President's power as Commander in Chief has been very broadly construed
when necessary. At the time the Yalta agreement was concluded military need,
rightly or wrongly, was believed to justify the concessions made. The major
objection to the Yalta agreement has obviously been political rather than legal.
There has alvays been a strong feeling, based on sound considerations of
policy, that far-reaching agreements determining American foreign policy
should, as a practical matter, receive the approval of the legislative branch of
government whenever possible. But the fate of the so-called Yalta Resolution
in Congress would seem to indicate that subsequent political protest is not the
proper measure of legal validity of a presidential agreement.7 4
68. Par, supra note 67, at 43, 50; Briggs, supra note 67, at 380, 382.
69. Par, supra note 67, at 51.
70. Id. at 51-54.
71. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 22-147 (Judg-
ment 1933).
72. See text at note 154 infra.
73. See note 42 supra.
74. Despite much demand by individual Congressmen for an unequivocal repudiation
of the secret wartime agreements, the draft resolution submitted by President Eisenhower
in February 1953 merely accused the Soviet Union of "perverting" the agreements "in
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Power to Commit Military Resources Abroad
One of the most controversial facets of the President's authority as Com-
mander in Chief is his power to commit the armed forces without a congres-
sional declaration of war. Although this power, by its nature, is often exercised
by other means than international agreements, in several important instances
the President has entered into agreements committing our military resources
abroad. It is evident that this use of the Commander in Chief power might
be substantially curtailed if the President is unable to conclude such agree-
ments. And the scope of his power to make international agreements in this
context can best be measured by the substantive exercises of the Commander
in Chief power to commit the armed forces.
Ever since 1787, it has been recognized that the President possesses the
power to meet military emergencies by the use of force whether or not Con-
gress has technically committed the nation to war. The existence of this power
is apparent from the legislative history of the constitutional provision con-
ferring upon Congress authority to "declare war."N7 The original draft of
this provision gave Congress power to "make" rather than "declare" war;70
but the provision was amended to its present form in order, as lfadison's
notes record the tenor of discussion, to "leave to the Executive the power to
repel sudden attacks." 77 The practical necessity of rapid and decisive action
to meet the swvift onslaught of modem war, and the need for occasional
isolated military action on a scale too small to justify declaration of war, indi-
cate the wisdom of this provision.78  Consequently, over the course of time
the responsibility for initiating and conducting military action, even when a
declaration of war is involved, has come to rest with the President." Invoca-
tion of the term "war" has been limited to a very few major military cam-
paigns,80 while there have been numerous instances of a so-called "retail use of
force"8 1 carried out under the constitutional authority of the President alone.
violation of [their] clear intent." N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1953, p. 4, cols. 3-4. Secretary of
State Dulles stated that "the declaration does not involve any actual repudiation of any
legally effective agreements." Rather, said Dulles, the draft declaration had two primary
purposes: "One is to register dramatically what we believe to be the many breaches by
the Soviet of the wartime understandings; and, secondly, to register equally dramatically
the desire and hope of the American people that the captive people shall be libarated."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1953, p. 3, cols. 2-3. The entire issue of the validity of such agree-
ments as Yalta was abandoned before the resolution reached a vote on the floor of
Congress.
75. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
76. See II FARRAN-, TnE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL COxvm'niox oF 1787, p. 163 (1937);
Douglas, The Constitutional and Legal Basis for the President's Action in Using Our
Armed Forces to Repel the Invasion of South Korea, 96 CONG. Rsc. 9647 (1950).
77. Quoted in II FARAND, op. cit. supra note 76, at 318.
78. See Douglas, supra note 76, at 9648.
79. Even the struggle between Lincoln and his Congress which, insofar as control
of the army was concerned was manifested in the activities of the Congressional Com-
mittee on the Conduct of the War, eventually resulted in a presidential victory.
80. See RoGERs, Woum PoLIiNG & THE CONSTITUTION 87 (1945).
81. See Douglas, supra note 76, at 9648.
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But executive use of military force is not without limit: the President may
use force only to protect the interests of the United States or the rights of its
citizens. 82 Within these broad bounds, military action has been taken for a
variety of reasons, some of which deserve particular mention.
Protection of the honor of the United States has caused the President to
call out the armed forces. President Buchanan, without congressional authori-
zation, ordered a naval attack on Cantonese forts for the stated purpose of
avenging an insult to the flag of the United States.83 And President Wilson
ordered the capture of Vera Cruz-an act later approved by Congress-for the
same purpose. It is, of course, not difficult to find in the background more
fundamental political motivations.
Military force has often been employed by the President to protect the
property or lives of American citizens abroad. In at least one instance the
courts have approved the President's authority to use the armed forces for
this purpose without congressional assent.84 Indeed, the power has become so
well established through repeated exercise that "some people have been misled
into thinking that the protection of American rights abroad is almost the only
justification for the use of troops abroad in the absence of organized hostilities,
and without the specific authority of Congress." 5
On a number of occasions the President has employed the Commander in
Chief power for the completely nondefensive purpose of aiding the development
of commercial relations. The use of American troops in the Boxer Rebellion in
1890 was partly justified on the ground of protecting the lives of American
citizens in China, but was largely motivated by the desire to secure peace in
China for the sake of commercial development.86 So also the lengthy foreign
intervention known as the "opening up" of Japan was conducted without
congressional authorization, from the first visit by Commodore Perry in 1853
to the international naval bombardment of Shimoneseki in 1863, in which the
United States was a participant.8
7
On several occasions Presidents have used force, without specific congres-
sional approval, to carry out the objectives of'treaties.88 Theodore Roosevelt
sent troops to Cuba to quell revolution, under the authority of the Platt Amend-
ment, which permitted the United States to intervene in Cuban affairs to
82. REPORT ON POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 7.
83. See BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 51 (1920).
84. Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. 111, No. 4186 (S.D.N.Y. 1860). See also In re
Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1890); Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36, 79
(1872) ; Perrin v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 543 (1868); and cases collected in the appendix
to ROGERs, op. cit. supra note 80.
85. REPORT ON POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 8.
86. Id. at 9.
87. Ibid.
88. A concurrent constitutional basis for such action is the provision obligating the
President to see that the laws are executed. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This has been
recognized, ever since Marshall's speech in Congress in 1800, to include the power to exe-
cute the provisions of treaties.
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preserve independence and protect the Cuban government. Congress appro-
priated the necessary funds but never acted directly to approve the President's
action. And President Cleveland sent troops to Panama in 1885 for the osten-
sible purpose of preserving Colombian sovereignty under a treaty with that
country. 9 Neither of these treaties specifically authorized the President to
employ force in its execution.
A distinct, and unquestionably the most important, occasion for presidential
use of force is the defense of the United States against actual or imminent
attack upon its territory or that of its allies. The dispute concerning the scope
of the President's constitutional power focuses here. The disagreement con-
cerns, not the existence of the power, but rather the various factual circum-
stances which permit its exercise. In the Price Cases 0o the Supreme Court
upheld the power of the President to use force to defend the Union against
Confederate attack despite the fact that no "war" had techmically been de-
dared by Congress. And it defined the most obvious of the factual situations
in which the President may exercise his power: "If a war be made by invasion
of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist
force by force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the chal-
lenge without waiting for any special legislative authority."01
These circumstances have, happily, been very rare in the history of the
United States, and with the exception of the Civil War and perhaps certain
incidents during the War of 1812 "invasion" has usually been more in the
nature of a nuisance. This was the case, for example, when in 1818 General
Jackson was sent into Florida, then a Spanish possession, to subdue Indians
who had been raiding the border.92
But the constitutional power of the President to take military action in
defense of the United States extends far beyond cases of actual invasion. An
early example is the action of President Polk in 1845 in sending American
troops into the territory of Texas, which was not then a part of the United
States.93 A report prepared by the Executive in 1951 to answer doubts that
the President had power to send forces to Europe in implementation of the
North Atlantic Treaty 94 pointed to numerous occasions when troops have been
stationed abroad as a defensive measure, in the absence of any actual attack
upon American territory or citizens abroad, and on the sole authority of the
President. By exchange of messages between President Roosevelt and the
Prime Minister of Iceland in July 194195 the United States undertook to de-
fend Iceland from attack, in return for the right to station American forces
89. REPORT ox PoumEs OF THE PREsmENr 11-13.
90. The Prize Cases, 2 Black (67 U.S.) 635 (1862).
91. Id. at 668.
92. BERDAHL, op. cit. supra note 83, at 65-67.
93. REPORT ON Powzas OF THE PRESIDENT 10.
94. See note 11 supra.
95. Defense of Iceland By United States Forces, July 1, 1941, 55 STAT. 1547,
E-A.S. No. 232.
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in that country. Similarly, in 1941 the United States by presidential agree-
ment recognized the sovereignty of Denmark over Greenland and undertook
to assist Greenland in preserving that statusY So also in 1947 the United
States exchanged notes with Guatemala and China affirming the consent of
those countries to the presence of American troops within their territories. 7
It has thus been consistently recognized that the President possesses constitu-
tional authority to implement national policy by stationing American troops
abroad where their presence will contribute to the defense of the United States,
even though they are not employed to repel an already attacking enemy.
Preventive agreements by the Commander in Chief need not, of course,
involve sending troops abroad. By an exchange of notes in 1940 the United
States gave destroyers to Great Britain in return for a ninety-nine year lease
of various naval and air bases in the Western Hemisphere. 5 The ensuing
controversy did not raise the question whether the President's action was
within his independent power as a matter of constitutional law. Rather, the
major conflict of opinion involved the question whether the agreement was
consistent with the international status of the United States in 1940, and
whether it contravened certain prior statutory provisions. 0
A different sort of objection has been raised to general statements of policy
with respect to national security which the President has issued from time to
time on his own motion, as in the case of the Monroe Doctrine, or jointly
96. Defense of Greenland, April 9, 1941, 55 STAT. 1245, E.A.S. No. 204. The agree-
ment was concluded between the United States and Denmark. Criticism of its validity
is not based upon the ground that the President lacked constitutional power to make
it, but rather on the argument that the other party to the agreement was without authority
to sign it. See Briggs, The Validity of the Greenland Agreement, 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 506
(1941).
97. United States Armed Forces in Guatamala, Aug. 29, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1663, and
United States Armed Forces in China, Sept. 3, 1947, 61 STAT. 3755, T.I.A.S. No. 1715.
The agreements were made in order to comply with the resolution of the United Nations
General Assembly requesting member nations to withdraw troops stationed in the territory
of any other member without the consent of the latter.
98. Naval and Air Bases Treaty with Great Britain, Sept. 2, 1940, 54 STAT. 2405,
E.A.S. No. 181. Subsequently, the two countries entered into a supplementary agreement
with respect to the status of Newfoundland. Agreement with Great Britain on Leased
Naval and Air Bases, Mar. 27, 1941, 55 STAT. 1560, E.A.S. No. 235.
99. The constitutional issue is not even raised by perhaps the most vigorous critic of
the agreement. See Briggs, Neglected Aspects of the Destroyer Deal, 34 Am. J. INT'L L.
569 (1940). Another critic believes that such a presidential agreement, even in the absence
of contrary legislation, would be invalid; but the basis of his argument appears to be only
a general conviction that no important international agreement should ever be concluded
by the President alone. He offers no firmer support for this opinion than certain "con-
stitutional understandings." Borchard, The Attorney General's Opinion on the Exchange
of Destroyers for Naval Bases, 34 Am. J. INT'L L. 690 (1940). For the view that, in the
absence of legislation to the contrary, such a transaction is properly the subject of presi-
dential agreement, see Wright, The Transfer of Destroyers to Great Britain, 34 AM. J.
INT'L L. 680 (1940), and Attorney General Jackson's statement, Acquisition of Naval and
Air Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 484 (1940).
[Vol, 64 :345
PRESIDENTIAL AGREEMENTS
with other nations as in the Act of Chapultepec.100 In the latter pronounce-
ment the American Republics mutually recognized the desirability of uniting
to keep peace and meet aggression, and recommended the conclusion of a
treaty to provide methods to achieve these purposes. A recent mutual security
statement issued under the independent authority of the President is, of course,
" the Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean Armistice,10' in which
those United Nations members participating in the Korean campaign pledged
their readiness to rejoin forces to resist new aggression. It has been suggested
that these general statements of policy, made in a time of no immediate danger,
do not of themselves afford a sufficient basis for the subsequent use of force
by the President.10 2 But such anticipatory identifications of national interest
might be said to make at least a presumptive case for the reasonableness of
presidential action.
Thus far, in investigating the substantive exercises of the Commander in
Chief's power to commit the armed forces, in order to ascertain the areas in
which he may find it necessary independently to conclude agreements, we
have seen that: the President has a recognized independent constitutional
authority to repel an actual attack directly upon the territory of the United
States; he may use force abroad where American interests are directly in ques-
tion; and he may station troops abroad and enter into various other military
arrangements as a preventive measure. But the extent of his power is less
certain in the event of an actual attack with only "indirect" effect on American
interests. This demand for a "direct" American interest is a natural conse-
quence of the apprehension that the Commander in Chief power may be
abused. Situations can be imagined in which the force of public opinion would
prove an insufficient safeguard, and it is difficult to withdraw from a military
campaign once undertaken, whatever counterbalancing control Congress may
possess over the pursestrings of the army.
The controversy evoked by American participation in the Korean conflict
illustrates the confusion and the possible perils resulting from use of the out-
moded concept of what is a direct effect on American interests. Although it
was said that "the constitutional powers of the President were exceeded and
the constitutional powers of the Congress of the United States were bypassed"
by our military action in Korea,'03 the action of the President seems well
within his independent authority.104 Today the interests of one nation are often
100. Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mar. 8, 1945, (O
STAT. 1831, T.I.A.S. No. 1543. This agreement was the forerunner of the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 STAT. 1631, T.I.A.S. No. 1838.
101. Korean Armistice Declaration, July 27, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2781.
102. Wright, Constitutional Procedure in t1w United States for Carrying Out Obli-
gations for Military Sanctions, 38 Am!. J. INT'L L 678, 682 (1944).
103. Statement of A. J. Schweppe, Hearings before Subconmnittee of Sc:ate Con-
mnittee on. the Judiciary on Si. Res. 1 & Si. Res. 43, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 62 (1953).
104. "The decision of the President to aid South Korea was, therefore, both in the
best interests of the United States and in no sense violated Constitutional thcory or prac-
tice. It was, instead, a sound measure to guard against an ultimate and indirect threat
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affected by acts occurring half a world away: "directness" of interest is no
longer a function of geographical propinquity. The concern of the United
States in Korea was indirect only in the sense that the danger posed by the
invasion of South Korea might not culminate in actual physical attack upon the
territory of the United States until some distant time. In every other sense it
affected American interests in the most direct manner possible.
The action of the President in the Korean conflict may also be justified
on the ground that the United Nations Charter, which was ratified by the
Senate as a treaty, broadens his independent powers to use the armed forces.
Secretary of State Dulles has recognized that the power of the President to
take military action can be broadened by the ratification of a treaty; he stated
that "one result of the North Atlantic Treaty is to enlarge somewhat the area
within which the President can make war, as against the so-called declaration
of war."' 0 5 Such a delegation of authority to the President by treaty does
no violence to the concept of separation of powers. It has been consistently
recognized that this concept applies in a different fashion to the conduct of
foreign affairs: so that the Government may act as a single entity, Congress
can delegate authority to the President that would not be constitutionally
permissible in domestic matters. 10 6 The treaty power of the Senate extends
to all matters of international concern. Therefore, the Senate can enlarge the
President's foreign affairs power by its ratification of a treaty. A common
method of by-passing this constitutional question has been to argue that the
effect of the treaty is not to increase the President's power, but merely to
define more broadly the purposes for which he may properly employ it.
In answer to the objection that the President's taking military action under the
North Atlantic Treaty is unconstitutional, the argument would run like this:
the Senate did not grant any new power but merely redefined the interests of
to the security of the United States." Douglas, The Constitutional and Legal Basis for
the President's Action. in itsing Our Armed Forces to Repel the Invasion of South Korea,
96 CONG. REc. 9647 (1950).
105. Hearings, supra note 103, at 887.
106. See text at notes 23-26 supra. But the courts have implied that there are con-
stitutional limits to congressional delegation of foreign affairs power. See Unitcd States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936) (dictum). A recent lower court
case illustrates this proposition even more forcefully. In Colonial Airlines, Inc. v. Adams,
87 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1949), plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of that portion of
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 STAT. 991 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 482(b),
601 (1952), which authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board to recommend to the President
the issuance of a permit to a foreign air carrier to make scheduled flights into the Unitcd
States. A majority of the three-judge district court held the delegation constitutional, on
the ground that the standards provided in the act to guide the Board's discretion were
adequate, since the delegated power related to foreign affairs. Judge Goldsborough dis-
sented on the ground that, although the standards provided to guide the Board were
sufficient, the Act did not require the President, in approving or disapproving the Board's
recommendation, to observe any standards; the delegation was consequently unconstitu-
tional. Thus, both majority and dissent recognized the necessity for sufficient standards
in a delegation of foreign affairs power.
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the United States, in defense of which the Commander in Chief power may
be exercised, to include considerations of mutual security which might other-
wise be regarded as too remote. As a matter of fact, it seems likely that the
President already possesses all the authority which the North Atlantic Treaty
requires him to exercise. Furthermore, this extremely technical distinction
between the scope of the President's authority and the scope of the objective
for which he may exercise his authority has little meaning. Though it may
afford a useful means to rationalize authority for presidential action in a
specific case, it is in fact a recognition of broad power.
Constitutional history has shown that the President can take military action
under his independent powers whenever the interests of the United States so
require. In the modern world the scope of America's interest can be deter-
mined only by reference to the state of affairs in the international arena as a
whole and to the over-all purposes of our foreign policy. Any rigid test of
protectable interest would leave the nation dangerously unequipped for sur-
vival. On the other hand, the President may not take military action where
the interests of the United States are not involved. In the absence of crisis
he should defer to the legislature. He is limited here by his own good faith,
by the impeachment power of Congress, and by numerous important political
considerations, such as the necessity of retaining congressional cooperation
and the advisability of permitting military policy to be guided to some extent
by public opinion. If these safeguards seem insufficient, it must be remembered
that there is no feasible alternative. The circumstances calling forth the exer-
cise of the Commander in Chief power cannot by their nature be anticipated.
.The same reasons which have given the President as Commander in Chief the
power to meet all international crises require that he have at his disposal all
the available techniques for implementing this power. Since, as we have seen,
agreement-making is often an essential technique, the President's ability inde-
pendently to conclude international agreements must be coextensive with his
substantive powers as Commander in Chief.107
Power to Receive Representatives of Foreign Governments
In contrast to the many international agreements which have been concluded
under the authority of the President as Commander in Chief, there have been
107. It should be noted that the President is not limited in the use of force to the
authority which he possesses as Commander in Chief. As the initiator of American
foreign policy, he often determines the interests of the United States which the Constitu-
tion permits him to defend. Thus the use of force to protect these interests is in effect
supported by his authority as Chief Executive. Furthermore, his constitutional duty to
execute the laws has been construed to include the law of nations. See text at notes 118-30
ira. And it has been said that "there exists today something in the nature of an interna-
tional common law by which aggressive war is made illegal." Schwvarzer & Wood, Presi-
dential Power and Aggression Abroad: .4 Constitutional Dilenna, 40 A.B.AJ. 394, 395(1954) (citing in support of this proposition the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Var Crimes
Trials, and the provision for international policing under U.N. CaRMu art. 43). If this be
so, his constitutional duty to execute the laws may afford the President an additional
authorization for the use of force abroad.
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very few such agreements based upon his power to receive representatives of
foreign governments. Nor is this surprising: receiving representatives and
recognizing their governments are peculiarly unilateral acts, not often suited
to the use of international agreements. Nonetheless, "there is an immense
authority latent in his power of recognition,"' 0 8 and if it is to be rationally
implemented in many contexts it must include the power to make international
agreements.
The President's discretion in the recognition of new governments and nation-
states and of belligerent status is not limited by the powers of the other branches
of government. 10 9 The recognition power may be of determinative importance
in foreign policy, President Wilson brought on the downfall of the -luerta
government in Mexico in 1915 by refusal to recognize it. Similarly, the refusal
of the United States to recognize the government of Communist China has
been a key factor in the international policy of the entire Western World.
The President also has complete discretion to refuse to receive particular
representatives of other governments, or to request the recall of foreign
officials as a form of censure or retaliation. 10 These techniques for restricting
or severing diplomatic relations have long been orthodox instruments of
foreign policy. And the President has established himself as the exclusive
medium through which all communication addressed by the outside world to
the United States is directed."'
Nothing, of course, prevents Congress from offering its advice to the Presi-
dent on matters of recognition or restrains the President from seeking it. For
example, it was Congress which suggested to the President that he not seek
to restore the Hawaiian monarchy by force, and, as one commentator remarks,
by that action "probably saved the Administration from a fatal error."""2
Furthermore, congressional recommendations, regardless of their soundness,
often prove extremely useful to the President in reflecting public opinion.
Obligation to See that the Laws are Executed
The constitutional duty of the President to see that the laws are faithfully
executed provides another basis for independent executive action. Although
execution of the laws often does not require the conclusion of international
agreements, such agreements may be essential to the fulfillment of this duty
108. LAsxi, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 174-75 (1940).
109. "In every case, as it appears, of a new government and of belligerency, the ques-
tion of recognition was determined solely by the Executive." 1 MoORE, Dic. INT'L L. 243-
44 (1906), quoted in CORWIVN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FoREIaN RLATIONs 72
(1917). See also The Divina Pastora, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 52 (1819) ; United States v.
Palmer, 3 Wheat. (16 U.S.) 610 (1818).
110. See CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELAoTONs 46 (1917).
111, See id. at 48-49, citing as a notorious departure from this rule the warning
addressed by the German Government directly to the American people through the
newspapers, cautioning them to stay out of the combat zones established during World
War I.
112. See id. at 45.
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in appropriate circumstances. Therefore the agreement-making technique must
be as available to the President for the discharge of this obligation as for the
implementation of his substantive powers.' 13
Several of the instances of the use of force abroad noted in the discussion of
the Commander in Chief power might equally well be justified under this
constitutional provision.114 Similarly, it has long been recognized that the
President may enforce the provisions of treaties under the same constitutional
authority."3-
The President's obligation to execute the "laws" may also require him to
enforce the provisions of international agreements other than treaties, despite
the argument that a strict construction of the supremacy clause of the Constitu-
tion 10 might seem to qualify only treaties as "laws." It has been suggested
that in using force to subdue the Boxer Rebellion the President was satisfying
his constitutional duty to execute an agreement as much as he vas exercising
his Commander in Chief power.117
Finally, it has been persuasively maintained that the obligation to execute
the laws includes a duty to execute the law of nations. This position was
first set forth by Attorney General Wirt in 1822,11 and has received at least
dictum support from the Supreme Court."0 The trial of World War II war
criminals may be viewed as a Presidential execution of international law,' 0
for it is not at all clear that congressional legislation authorized all the functions
of the International Military Tribunal. The charter of this tribunal,'-" agreed
113. "Incident to the power to see that the laws are faithfully executed [the Presi-
dent] has power to enter into agreements with foreign countries necessary to their
enforcement." Statement by Judge Parker, Hcarings, supra note 103, at 711-12.
114. See CoRiWN, THE PRESmENT: OFFICE AND POWERs 167-70 (2d ed. 1941).
115. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL ExEcuTIvE AGREEImIENs 316-17 (1941).
116. U.S. CowsT. art. VI, c. 2.
117. McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Execntive or Presidential Agree-
ments: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YWuXu L.J. 181, 248, 280-81
(1945).
118. Restoration of a Danish Slave, 1 Ops. AviY GEN. 566, 570-71 (12): "The
President is the executive officer of the laws of the country; these laws are not merely
the Constitution, statutes, and treaties of the United States, but those general laws of
nations which govern the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations ....
The United States, in taking the rank of a nation, must take with it the obligation to
respect the rights of other nations. This obligation becomes one of the laws of the country;
to the enforcement of which, the President, charged by his office with the execution of all
our laws, and charged in a particular manner with the superintendence of our intercourse
with foreign nations, is bound to look... !'
119. McDougal & Lans, supra note 117, at 248; See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64
(1890) (dictum). Also see McCLURE, INTEmNATIONAL F.x uTin AG --E.ME,, 317-19
(1941).
120. "The grant of power to the Congress [to define and punish offenses against the
law of nations] does not necessarily preclude exercise of authority by the President."
I-irota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 207 (1948) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas).
121. Agreement for Prosecution of Major War Criminals, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 STAT.
1544, E.A.S. No. 472.
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to by the Executive in 1945, defined three kinds of crimes for which the major
German war criminals were to be tried: violations of the "laws and customs
of war" as established by international law; crimes against humanity; and
crimes against peace. The first category was traditional, and included the
murder of hostages and prisoners of war, "wanton destruction," and "devas-
tation not justified by military necessity." The other two categories, however,
were novel. The second included the enslavement or extermination of civilian
populations, and persecution on racial, political, or religious grounds. The
third category made criminal the waging of aggressive war.
Congress has authorized the President to establish military commissions
for the trial of violations of the international laws of war. The Articles of
War 122 authorize the President to establish military commissions for the trial
of persons who can be tried by military tribunals under the laws of war. The
jurisdiction of such commissions appears to include not only offenses derived
from the laws of war but also those created by congressional legislation. The
Espionage Act of 1917 123 recognizes use of military commissions. On the
basis of these statutes the Supreme Court concluded in Ex parte Quirin 124
that the President acted validly in ordering trial by military commission for
eight saboteurs who were captured after being landed by submarine on the
East Coast in June 1942. And in passing on the military trial of General
Yamashita 125 for crimes committed in the Pacific War, the Supreme Court
stated:
"[T]he order creating the commission for the trial of petitioner was
authorized by military command, and was in complete conformity to the
Act of Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals for the trial
of offenses against the law of war ... ,,12;
Even a dissenter to the result in that case admitted that authority for
the trial stemmed from the constitutional power of Congress to "define
and punish . . .Offences against the Law of Nations. ' 127 The language
of the Court in these cases indicates that even in the absence of congressional
authorization the President would have had power to order the trial of these
criminals. If international law is the law of the land, and it is commonly
agreed that it is, 12s the President certainly has the authority and the duty
to enforce it. One commentator has said, "Regardless of the manner or extent
to which it may be implemented by national law, the law of nations is the
122. 41 STAT. 787-812 (1920).
123. 40 STAT. 219 (1917), 50 U.S.C. § 38 (1952).
124. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
125. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
126. Id. at 11.
127. Id. at 26.
128. See Att'y Gen. Wirt's opinion, supra note 118. For a summary of various phases
of this subject, see Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States, 101. U. PA. L. Rsv. 26, 792 (1952-53).
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ultimate source of the authority to establish military tribunals to try offenses
against the law of war."
112
9
But the authority of the American representatives on the Nuremberg
tribunal to sit on prosecutions for the second and third categories of crimes
can best be traced to the power of the President. The crimes for which
Congress authorized trial by military commission include only violations of
the laws of war or supplementary congressional legislation. "Crimes against
peace and humanity," although they represent a rational development of an-
cient doctrines of international law, have not been regarded as within any
traditional definition of the laws of war. To the extent that the charter of
the Nuremberg tribunal expanded the traditional laws of war it may be justi-
fied as an exercise of the President's authority as Commander in Chief. With
this valid constitutional basis, the agreement became a part of international
law which the President was obligated to execute as part of the law of the
land. The bootstrap effect of combining these two constitutional provisions
is subject to other constitutional and practical safeguards.13 0
Power as Chief Executive
The remaining constitutional source of the President's power in the field of
foreign affairs is the provision authorizing him to act as Chief Executive.
In a sense, this may be said to be the ultimate authority from which his
power to make agreements arises.13' By virtue of this constitutional pro-
vision the President has always been recognized as the sole representative of
the United States in conducting negotiations with other nations.13 2 This is
the meaning of Jefferson's famous remark that the transaction of business
with foreign nations is executive altogether. In addition to control over
negotiations, the President as Chief Executive possesses a number of other
broad powers, some of which by their nature may not often require imple-
mentation by international agreement.
The Chief Executive power may afford still another basis for the use of
force abroad to protect American interests.lm Employment of force has fre-
quently been in furtherance of general statements of United States policy,
such as the Monroe Doctrine, which were promulgated under the authority
of the President as Chief Executive. This was the case, for example, when
Theodore Roosevelt acted after Senate delay to seize and administer the cus-
129. Cowles, Trial of War Criminals by Military Tribunals, 30 A.B.A.J. 330, 331
(1944).
130. See text at notes 158-65 infra.
131. See 5 HA cKwoRTH, DIGEST OF IN'L LAw 402 (1943).
132. The exclusive power of the President to be the medium of communication to
and from foreign nations is, of course, also established by the constitutional provL :on
authorizing him to receive representatives from foreign governments. Sce te::t at notei
103-12 supra.
133. MYcDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-
inents: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YAm L.J. 181, 250 (1945).
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toms houses in Santo Domingo to prevent their being taken over by European
creditors. 134 Similarly, the Chief Executive power has been invoked to au-
thorize the President to settle claims held by private citizens against other
nations, 135 and to grant commercial rights to foreign businesses.
The President and his high-ranking subordinates have frequently conferred
with the heads of other governments on major issues of foreign policy, and
have issued general statements which, although not purporting to possess
binding force, give direction to the foreign policy of the United States. Several
joint statements were issued during and after the recent World War. These
are obviously within the Commander in Chief power, but insofar as they
determine the broad outlines of American foreign policy in time of peace it
would seem that they are also exercises of the President's power as Chief
Executive. Among the more important recent statements of this type were
the Atlantic Charter,'3" outlining a general policy to be jointly followed by
the United States and the United Kingdom in seeking to establish a durable
peace, the declaration with respect to the use and control of atomic energy,137
the Yalta agreement, the Joint Policy Declaration Concerning the Korean
Armistice,' 38 and the Moscow Agreement of 1945,130 regarding the policies
to be followed by the big three nations with respect to conditions in South-
eastern Europe and the Far East. It is increasingly by means of such con-
ferences and declarations that recent Presidents have set the course of Ameri-
can foreign policy. This exertion of Presidential control over foreign affairs
seems readily justifiable under the power conferred on the President as Chief
Executive.
The Relative Scope of Independent Executive Agreements
Despite the fact that presidential agreements have been employed with
greatly increased frequency in recent years, it has been forcefully argued that
the power of the President to make international agreements is not as broad
as the treaty power. Some of these arguments appear to rest upon no firmer
basis than the circular proposition that, since the legal consequences of presi-
dential agreements are more limited than those of treaties, the scope of agree-
ments must be less than that of treaties. 40 Whatever its rationale, a strong
sentiment persists that presidential agreements are to some degree more
limited in scope than treaties or congressional-executive agreements. 141 The
134. See CORWIN, THE CONSTTUTON AND WO=uD ORGANIZATION 39 (1944); 5
HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 131, at 402-03.
135. McDougal & Lans, supra note 133, at 249, 251, citing illustrations from the
terms of John Adams and Jackson.
136. The Atlantic Charter, Aug. 14, 1941, 55 STAT. 1603, E.A.S. No. 236.
137. Atomic Energy Declaration by United States, United Kingdom, and Canada,
Nov. 15, 1945, 60 STAT. 1479, T.I.A.S. No. 1504.
138. Korean Armistice Declaration, July 27, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2781.
139. Moscow Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 STAT. 1899, T.I.A.S. No. 1555.
140. See Borchard, Editorial Comment 39 Am. J. INT'L L. 537, 538 (1945).
141. "We do not think that executive agreements should rise or were ever intended
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outer limits of the President's independent power to make agreements have
never been clear. The present Secretary of State remarked in legislative hear-
ings on the Bricker Amendment:
"It has long been recognized that difficulties exist in the determination
as to which international agreements should be submitted to the Senate
as treaties, which ones should be submitted to both Houses of the Con-
gress, and which ones do not require any congressional approval ....
[I]t would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fit all agreements
into set categories .... [T] he Executive cannot surrender the freedom
of action which is necessary for its operations in the foreign-affairs
field."'4
Any attempt to define the difference between presidential agreements and
treaties or congressional-executive agreements in terms of the subject matter
to which such agreements properly extend must inevitably be unsatisfactory.
There is no way to anticipate the necessities of foreign affairs with sufficient
precision to permit an exact allocation of subject-matter between these various
techniques. The controversy engendered by the proposed Bricker Amend-
ment amply illustrates the difficulties and dangers of an effort to impose
specific limitations in advance.
Attempt is sometimes made to determine the proper scope of the President's
independent power to conclude international agreements by reference to the
specific provisions of the Constitution.143 But the Constitution, as has been
seen, is hopelessly vague as to the allocation of the foreign affairs power
among the various branches of the Federal Government. And assuming that
the intent of the Founding Fathers should be regarded as controlling, and
that it could be determined with certainty on some problems, it is plainly
impossible to determine how they intended to allocate power to deal vith
subjects which did not exist in their day.
The suggestion has been made that the President has no independent con-
stitutional authority to conclude an international obligation which requires
the exercise of congressional powers for its fulfillment.' 44 This proposed test
e
to rise to the dignity of treaties; . . . there is a legitimate area fur executive agreements,
but executive agreements should not be used to bypass the treaty powers ...." Statement
by A. J. Schweppe, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate committce on Me
Judiciary on S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 44 (1952). Also see LAsKI, TnE AumlcAxz
PRESIDENCY 177 (1940); Hyde, Cotstitutional Procedures for intenmtional Agrc-cwnt
by the United States, 31 PRoc. Am. Soc'y INr'L L. 45, 52 (1937).
142. Statement by Secretary of State Dulles, Hearings before Subcommittee of Scnate
Committee on the Judiciary on S.. Res. 1 & Si. Res. 43, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 65 (1953).
143. See, e.g., statements by Judge Phillips, Hearings, stpra note 142, at 996, and
Schweppe, Hearings, supra note 141, at 43.
144. This was apparently the theory of Attorney General Jackson in his opinion
regarding the validity of the bases and destroyers exchange: "Some negotiatiuns involve
commitments as to the future which would carry an obligation to exercise powers vested
in the Congress. Such Presidential arrangements are customarily submitted for ratifica-
tion by a two-thirds vote of the Senate before the future legislative power of the country
is committed." Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases in Exchange for Over-age Destroyers,
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raises several questions. In the first place, it is sometimes difficult to know
whether the future exercise of congressional power required by an agreement
forms a part of the international obligation or whether it relates merely to
our effective utilization of the agreement. In the destroyer exchange a failure
of Congress to appropriate money for the development of bases would not
have affected the international obligation assumed by the United States, since
the undertaking was completely discharged by the transfer.14 But in the case
of an international agreement to use military force the failure of Congress to
appropriate funds might result in the inability of the United States to carry
out its part of the agreement. If such indirect effect upon the fulfillment of
the international obligation is intended to be within the scope of the sug-
gested test, the test seems too broad. Its consequence would be to make
impossible many kinds of action traditionally undertaken by the President
under his independent powers, as well as by the President and the Senate
under the treaty power, since in ultimate analysis most future commitments
are likely to require at least an appropriation of funds by Congress for their
fulfillment.' 46 Furthermore, in referring to the congressional participation
required in order that the international agreement conform to American con-
stitutional law, this principle constitutes, of course, not a criterion but a con-
clusion which assumes that certain subject-matters are beyond presidential
power and exclusively within the competence of the whole Congress. The
problem remains to determine what kinds of international agreements may be
undertaken by treaty or by executive-congressional collaboration, as distin-
guished from those which may be concluded by the President alone. The
''congressional action" test seems merely to restate the issue.
Of equally little utility is the suggestion that "legislative" matters may be
undertaken only in the form of a treaty while "adjudicative" matters are
proper subjects for an executive agreement. "Legislative" acts are customarily
defined as those which establish general rules guiding the future course of
conduct; "adjudicative" acts, on the other hand, purport only to dispose of
a single immediate controversy upon its particular facts. Thus defined, it is
evident that the vast majority of international agreements are "legislative,"
including a great number of presidential agreements whose constitutionality
is scarcely open to question.' 47 A distinction between formulation and appli-
39 Ops. Ar'Y GEN. 484, 487 (1940). See also Wright, Editorial Comment, 34 Am. J.
INT'L L. 680, 681 (1940).
145. See Wright, supra note 144, at 681 & -. 7.
146. Insofar as this test states merely the desirable principle of cooperation between
the legislative and executive branches of government, it is, of course, unexceptionable. It
is presumably in this sense that another commentator has said that: "The Executive
would be acting improperly ... if he entered into an agreement imposing on the United
States an obligation which he knew, or had reason to believe, to be unenforceable."
Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation, 17 J. AIR L.
& Comm. 436, 443 (1950).
147. Perhaps armistice agreements, with their customarily detailed provisions govern-
ing the future conduct of the parties, provide one of the best illustrations.
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cation of policy can never be precisely drawn. Consequently, any attempt to
impose a "legislative"-"adjudicative" dichotomy on the constitutional problem
of agreements can only result in hopelessly confusing the issue.
During the course of the controversy regarding the proposed Bricker
Amendment and its substitutes, it was often suggested that the proper test
of the scope of presidential power in foreign affairs depends upon whether
the agreement in question is "important" or "unimportant." All "important"
agreements may only, according to this view, be made by treaty. Obviously
this is imprecise language, which affords no basis for distinguishing one
category from the other. The word "important" would appear to obscure a
consideration of the extent to which the agreement in question constitutes a
policy commitment on the part of the United States. Many agreements are
either of so temporary a character, or relate to so minor a matter, that their
role in the determination of foreign policy is negligible. Others are consider-
ably more important in this respect. Traditionally, it is the Executive rather
than the Legislattiie which is charged with the ultimate determination of the
course of foreign policy, however much Congress may participate in an ad-
visory capacity. But it does not follow that the broader the policy commit-
ment involved, the clearer should be the President's right of e:xclusive deter-
mination of the issue. On the contrary, as the extent of commitment increas es,
the undesirability of unilateral decision becomes more apparent.
Traditionally, this problem of determining the limits of the President's in-
dependent power to make agreements has been cast in terms of the pulitical
theory of separation of powers. There is little question that the major pur-
pose of the draftsmen of the Constitution in trisecting the national govern-
ment was to protect private rights from infringement by tyrannical au-
thority.1 48 Consequently, it is not surprising to find the concept worled out
far more carefully in those provisions of the Constitution which relate to
domestic affairs; in 1787 it was in this area that the principal threat to private
liberties was anticipated. Today, even if it can be argued that there is an
analogous risk resulting from the conduct of foreign affairs, the principle
that no international agreement in contravention of constitutional rights can
be valid, together with the sanctions, both legal and practical, by which this
principle is enforced, should suffice to relieve all danger from this source.A40
148. See Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of the "Separation of Powers," 2
U. CHL L. REv. 385 (1935). Justice Brandeis said, in the course of his famous dissent
in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293-95 (1926): "The doctrine of the separation
of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy .... In America, as in England, the
conviction prevailed then that the people must look to representative assemblies for the
protection of their liberties."
149. For a collection of the case law and authorities supporting such confidence, see
McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Commumnity: Constitutional
Illusions Versus Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60, 104 n.240 (1949).
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The major purpose of the Constitutional Convention in embodying the
concept of separation of powers in the Constitution, was not to divide the
policy-making function of government among its several branches as an end in
itself, but rather to do so in order that the formulation of policy should not
trench upon the individual rights of citizens. Its real purpose must be kept
in mind when considering the manner in which the concept of separation of
powers should properly apply to the conduct of foreign relations. A broad
control by the President over the making of policy appears consistent with
the intent of the drafters of the Constitution, so long as private rights are
not placed in jeopardy.
The concept of separation of powers presupposes that the three functions
of government can be distinguished. In the domestic realm this distinction
is sufficiently difficult. In the field of foreign affairs this difficulty becomes
virtually an impossibility. In the process of policy formulation there is an
imperceptible shading of "diplomacy," which is an executive function, into
"agreement-making," which may be executive or legislative. The process of
agreement-making, in turn, includes those agreements which are "adjudi-
cative." Yet the great bulk of all international agreements is "legislative" in
character. In fact the conduct of foreign relations is a continuing process of
policy formulation and application; it cannot be broken down into the alleged-
ly neat categories of the doctrine of separation of powers.150
Any meaningful answer to the problem of the scope of the President's
agreement power must be framed in terms of the necessities of national
survival in the modern world. In these terms, it should be evident that a
broad degree of presidential control over the foreign affairs of the nation is
in no sense incompatible with the principles on which our government was
built. The President is in a better position than the electorate, or either of
the other branches of government, to give informed guidance in the conduct
of foreign affairs. Reasonably, he should be accorded a broader discretion
in establishing foreign policy than domestic policy: the Congress, whose mem-
bers are elected largely on the basis of local issues, possesses a greater degree
of information and competence in domestic matters than it does in the foreign
field.
Furthermore, it is a primary requisite of the conduct of foreign affairs that
the nation be able to act swiftly, and secretly, at need. Congress is poorly
equipped to meet either of these requirements. In the domestic field, we can
afford friction among the three branches of government, which, by its effect
of slowing decision and inducing compromise, has the consequence of promot-
ing the responsiveness of policy makers to the country as a whole.151 But
150. "The strength of Congress consists in the right to pass statutes; the strength of
the President in his right to veto them. But foreign affairs ... cannot be brought within
the scope of statutes .... [Foreign affairs] cannot be provided for beforehand by laws
general in application, but minutely particular in wording." 1 BRYcE, THE AME IUcA1
COMMONWEALTH 224, 220 (3d ed. 1895).




in matters involving the external relations of the nation, this friction may
become a great source of serious danger. This is far more true today than
in 1787. And it is inevitable that the needs of the nation for a unified and
effective foreign policy will increase with the years. As in the past, these
needs must be met by a process that is essentially pragmatic, which will re-
sult in a gradual, case by case delineation of the subject matter for presi-
dential agreements, on the one hand, and for treaties and congressional-
executive agreements, on the other. What the course of this delineation will
be can never be fully predicted in advance, for it necessarily depends upon
particular situations and the internal and external stresses with which the
nation is faced. Consequently, the extent of the President's power in foreign
affairs must vary with the context of events in which it must be exercised.
The degree of crisis and the amount of time available for decision have
customarily determined the scope of the President's substantive powers in
the field of foreign affairs, and, therefore, the scope of his authority to im-
plement these powers by means of appropriate international agreements.
Where the emergency is great and time is short, the President has consistent-
ly been recognized to possess powers which, in less critical periods, might
be held to extend too far. This result has been both desirable and inevitable.
It is consistent with the intent of the men who drafted the Constitution that
the method of democracy be one of adjustment and compromise, guided
always by the indispensable consideration that the power of the President to
conduct our foreign relations must keep pace with the necessities of national
survival.
Legal Consequences of Executive Agreements
Generally, the legal consequences of valid presidential agreements do not
differ significantly from those of treaties or of congressional-executive agree-
ments.. 52 Virtually all the legal limitations of all three methods are cus-
tomarily attributed to domestic, as opposed to international, law. Of course,
the line separating the "international" from the "domestic" consequences of
an international agreement is difficult to draw. In the modern world inter-
national and domestic affairs are inevitably interrelated. Moreover, the term
"domestic effect" itself has two meanings: it may refer to the fact that an
international agreement is in conflict with municipal law, or it may have
reference to the broader proposition that the agreement will affect in some
fashion the private rights of citizens within the country in question.
Under the municipal law of the United States there is no question that in
an appropriate judicial proceeding a presidential agreement is just as enforce-
able as a treaty.1 3 It is also recognized that presidential agreements may
modify, or even terminate, prior treaties.154 Similarly, although the issue
152. The one important caveat to this general rule is that presidential agreements,
unlike treaties, may not be able, in certain contexts, to overrule prior congressional acts.
See text at notes 174-77 infra.
153. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937).
1955]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
seldom arises, by the better view an executive agreement can override state
law.155 To hold otherwise would be to subject the foreign policy of the
nation to the whims of a single state. The only judicial decisions squarely
presenting the question, the Belmont xr6 and Pink 157 cases, have held that
presidential agreements are superior to inconsistent state legislation. Some
commentators have argued that Pink and Belmont mean that presidential
agreements may override state legislation only when supported by the Presi-
dent's constitutional power to recognize foreign governments. But there is
no reason to limit the rule of these cases so closely.
The domestic consequences of presidential agreements probably can be
superseded by subsequent congressional legislation in those fields in which
Congress possesses independent power to act.' 58 This seems an a fortiori
conclusion from the established proposition that Congress possesses such
power with respect to a prior treaty.1 9 The constitutional basis of this familiar
principle is the supremacy clause, °10 which, in making the Constitution,
laws, and treaties the supreme law of the land, has been construed to give
effect to the law or treaty most recent in time. Although the supremacy
clause makes no mention of presidential agreements, they might now be
considered as included by implication, since it has generally been recognized
that they may modify or even terminate treaties. 151 So construed, the su-
premacy clause enables subsequent legislation to prevail equally over treaties
154. "[T]reaties of the United States have been terminated on several occasions by
the President, now on his own authority, now in accordance with a resolution of Congress,
at other times with the sanction simply of the Senate." CORWIN, TuIE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
AND POWERS 243 (2d ed. 1941). For the historical development of the presidential
power of termination, see id. at 416 & n.107. This proposition is impliedly recognized in
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 474, 476 (1913): "The executive department having
thus elected to waive any right to free itself from the obligation [of the treaty], it Is
the plain duty of the court to recognize the obligation . . . ." President Roosevelt
terminated at least two treaties under his independent constitutional powers: the extradi-
tion treaty with Greece, in 1933, and the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with
Japan, in 1939. See CORWIN, op. cit. supra, at 417.
155. See Hearings before Subcommittee of Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
S.J. Res. 1 & Si. Res. 43, 83d Cong., 1st sess. 247 (1953).
156. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
157. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
158. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 155, at 224; Hearings, supra note 141, at 420;
MacChesney et al., The Treaty Power and the Constitution: The Case Against Amend-
ment, 40 A.B.A.J. 203, 205 (1954) ; Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive
Agreements, and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARV. L. REv. 281, 287 (1953); Lissitzyn, The
Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation, 17 J. AIR L. & Comm. 436,
444 (1950).
159. See Hearings, supra note 155, at 40-41; Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41
(1951) (dictum); Pigeon River Improvement Co. v. Cox, 291 U.S. 138 (1934) (same).
160. U.S. CONsr. art. VI, cI. 2
161. See text at notes 174-76 infra discussing the inclusion of presidential agreements




and presidential agreements. Furthermore, Congress may limit the President's
power to make effective agreements in other ways: it can withhold appro-
priations, or refuse to enact implementing legislation where such is needed.
International agreements of all kinds, including presidential agreements,
are limited by the guarantees of private rights contained in the Constitution.
Although the First Amendment by its words limits only the operations of
Congress, it has consistently been interpreted to apply with equal force to
the other branches of the Federal Government, including the President.10 2
The applicability of the First Amendment to all branches of the Federal
Government is confirmed by the Fifth Amendment:
"Read literally, the First Amendment of the Constitution forbids only
Congress to abridge these freedoms. But as the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment extends the prohibition to all state action,
the due process clause of the Fifth must extend it to all federal action.Im
All the other constitutional Amendments relating to the Federal Government
are phrased in terms which restrict all its branches, including the Executive.
It thus appears that the language of the Constitution affords no ground for
apprehension that a presidential agreement might contravene private rights.
This conclusion is justified by numerous opinions of the Supreme Court.'
Since no agreement has ever been found unconstitutional, these judicial state-
ments are dicta in the technical sense, but they reflect a consistent and un-
equivocal attitude of judicial vigilance.
In addition to constitutional limitations, there are several practical safe-
guards against infringement of constitutionally guaranteed rights by a presi-
dential agreement. The pressure of public opinion and other political con-
siderations have always served as a deterrent to reckless presidential action.
And Congress can refuse to implement legislation or to provide appropria-
tions. The fact that no presidential agreement has ever been declared un-
constitutional should thus be a cause for confidence rather than concern.
As a matter of municipal law presidential agreements may be of as long
162. See MacChesney et aL., supra note 158, at 205.
163. Edgerton, J., in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. Clark, 177 F2d 79,
87 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (dissenting opinion).
164. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (dictum); Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890) (same); The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. (78 U.S.)
616, 620-21 (1870) (same). These statements all relate to treaties, and would apply a
fortiori to presidential agreements. The dissent of Chief Justice Vinson in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, (67 (1952), does not in any way
qualify this conclusion. The view expressed in the opinion of the Court was nu that
the President's seizure was per se a violation of the Fifth Amendment, but rather that
here the President had usurped the law-making function, there being no congressional
legislation authorizing the seizure. Vinson merely contended that existing legislation
did in fact authorize the President's action, referring to the contemporary world situation
and certain legislative statements of national policy, such as the North Atlantic Treaty.
There was no intimation that such treaties permitted the President to contravene the
Fifth Amendment.
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duration as international agreements of any other sort. The assumption that
presidential agreements must terminate with the term of the President making
them is without basis in fact and is largely being abandoned today.10 5 It is
true that a large number of presidential agreements are of a temporary charac-
ter or deal with matters which are immediately settled. But the frequency
of short-term agreements does not mean that an agreement cannot legally
be of longer duration. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement and the Gentlemen's
Agreement with Japan are two of the better-known examples of long-term
presidential agreements. 16  Furthermore, it is inevitable that many presiden-
tial agreements dealing with important issues of foreign policy will have a
long-continued effect upon the foreign relations of the United States. For
example, the "Bases-Destroyers Deal" of 1940 is said to have played a part
in directing the foreign policy of this country towards formation of the pres-
ent North Atlantic defensive alliance.
16 I
Nor do the doctrines of international law impose requirements upon presi-
dential agreements as to formality or duration. No particular formalities are
required to create a binding international agreement; indeed, an unwritten
agreement may be valid. 6 8 It is debatable whether a state which undertakes
an obligation by ratification by an apparently competent organ may under
international law later deny the competence of that organ.10 9 But whatever
the ultimate prescription of international law upon this point, it is evident
that any argument which seeks to prove the invalidity of a presidential agree-
ment on the ground of the President's incompetence under international law,
must assume the incapacity of the President to conclude the agreement under
American constitutional law, which is, of course, the point at issue. Finally,
duration of international agreements is not limited by international law;
nations are obliged to continue honoring agreements according to their terms,
in the absence of invocation of the various doctrines relating to termination,
such as rebus sic stantibits. But in practice it may happen that agreements
will not continue to be observed when the undertaking becomes too onerous,
even though the international obligation be violated. The policy considerations
which might cause a nation to break an international agreement are not likely
to vary with the constitutional form in which the agreement is cast.
Thus, by the doctrines of both international and municipal law, the legal
consequences of a treaty, an independently concluded executive agreement,
and a congressional-executive agreement are substantially the same.
165. Except by certain proponents of the Bricker Resolution, who continue hopefully
to repeat the ancient misapprehension. See Hearings before a subcomntletie of the Senate
Committee on the Jvdiciary on SJ. Res. 130, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 439 (1952).
166. See CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND W6RLD ORGANIZATION 43 (1944).
167. Ibid.
168. The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B No. 53, pp. 22-147
(Judgment 1933).
169. See 5 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INT'L LAW, 393 (1943); LAUTERPACIT, Rm'OrT
ON THE LAW OF TRiATIES A/CN. 4/63 (U.N. Int'l Law Comm'n) 157-73 (1953); 29
Am. J. INT'L LAW, L OF TREATEs 992-1009, 1029-44 (Supp. 1935).
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POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE PRESIDENTIAL AGREEMENTS
The scope of the President's power to conclude international agreements
has, thus, never been clearly defined, and can only be indicated approximately
by an estimate of the requirements of modern international relations guided
by the various exercises of presidential power which have been recognized as
constitutional during the course of our history. A question of equal current
interest and at least equal difficulty is to what extent may Congress con-
stitutionally limit the President in the exercise of this power. Senator
Bricker's proposed limitations upon the President's agreement-making ability
took the form of a constitutional amendment. But the argument was fre-
quently advanced in the course of the controversy over the Bricker amend-
ment that Congress already has sufficient power to accomplish the result of
the amendment. This is the theory of the recent MNcCarran Resolution "to
impose limitations with regard to Executive agreemients."' 70 Although that
resolution does not make it entirely clear what types of agreements are in-
tended to be affected,171 it squarely presents the question of the power of the
legislative branch to control the executive branch in the conduct of foreign
affairs.
At the outset it should be understood what is meant by congressional
"limitation" of the President's foreign affairs power. Congress has frequent-
ly authorized the President to act as its agent in matters pertaining to foreign
affairs, and it has never been doubted that in such cases Congress controls
the extent of the power delegated. This proposition is self-evident, although
the overlapping of congressional and presidential powers so common in this
sphere may obscure the issue. If the powers which Congress purports to
delegate to the President are not as broad as those cognate powers which he
possesses independently with respect to the same subject matter, it may nut
even appear that any limitation upon the President's own powers was in-
tended. And if such an intent should appear, its constitutionality would be
most dubious. If, on the other hand, the powers which Congress delegates
to the President are broader than those which he independently possesses,
Congress can define the extent of the delegation, and subsequently revoke
it if it wishes.
The doctrine is established that Congress may, acting within the scope of
its enumerated powers, override the domestic consequences of a presidential
agreement by subsequent legislation. Similarly, Congress may achieve the same
result by imposing restrictions in advance on the President's power to make
international agreements. Normally the method employed by Congress is to
170. S.J. Res. 2, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953).
171. The term "executive agreements" may or may not be taken to include presi-
dential declarations of policy issued jointly with other nations, such as the Declaration of
Lima in 1938, the Atlantic Charter, the declaration with respect to atomic energy, or
the United Nations declaration on the Korean armistice.
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prescribe a certain method of exercising the power in question, and thus by
implication to exclude all other means.1 7 2
The proposition has been put forward that the power of Congress to
regulate the scope of presidential agreements is only co-extensive with the
powers which Congress itself possesses to act in the field of foreign affairs
or to regulate domestic consequences.'" As a matter of logic this is a reason-
able doctrihe, for it is difficult to conceive by what authority Congress could
prevent the President from acting in an area to which his powers extend and
those of Congress do not extend even indirectly. Although the foreign and
domestic powers of Congress are extremely broad, there may exist certain
areas in which the President's constitutional power to conclude international
agreements may be exercised to produce domestic consequences beyond the
pale of congressional regulation. In these areas the President could enter into
such international agreements as he might desire, unrestricted by any power
in Congress either to limit him in advance or to overrule subsequently the
domestic consequences of his action. Similarly, the President and two-thirds
of the Senate could conclude treaties in this residual area, and Congress
would be powerless to override their domestic effects.
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that the "domestic effects" doctrine
must be qualified: it is not categorically true, as has been so often argued,
that Congress can abrogate the domestic effect of any international agreement;
rather, Congress can overrule an agreement only when it concerns a subject
with respect to which Congress could have legislated domestically. In the
vast majority of cases this limitation on the power of Congress will not be
pertinent; the constitutional powers of Congress have been recognized to be
increasingly broad in recent years. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situa-
tion in which the President is likely to make an executive agreement whose
domestic consequences are not within one or another of the powers of
Congress as currently construed. In the case of a treaty, however, the like-
lihood might be greater. But even then Congress would not be powerless. It
could still refuse appropriations or such implementing legislation as might
be required. And it is entirely conceivable that if a court felt the necessity
sufficiently great, the domestic powers of Congress might be construed as
broad enough to meet the situation.
The constitutional power of Congress to limit the President in the exercise
of his agreement-making power is dependent on the viability of the doctrine
172. This may have been what occurred in the Capps case, discussed in text at note
178 infra.
173. This proposition in its inverse form, was stated by Mr. Justice Jackson, con-
curring in the Steel Seizure case: "When the President takes measures incompatible with
the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over
the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Youngtown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952).
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that presidential agreements cannot supersede congressional legislation. The
Supreme Court has "intimated that the President might act in external
affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act contrary
to an Act of Congress."' 7 4 The constitutional justification for this rule is
that the President's power to make international agreements derives from his
position as Chief Executive; since by Article I, section 7, the President has
no power to repeal existing federal law, he cannot accomplish an indirect
repeal by means of a presidential agreement' 75 But, on the other hand,
presidential agreements may be ranked on a par with congressional enact-
ments by the supremacy clause. The Pink case reasoned that a treaty is a
"Law of the Land" under the supremacy clause and that, "such international
compacts and agreements as the Litvinov Assignment have a similar dignity."
The Court relied on the Federalist, No. 64, for the proposition that "All
constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the judicial
department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded
from the Legislature . . . ." In the Pink case, however, the issue was whether
presidential agreements could override contrary state laws. The Court may
have intended to include presidential agreements within the supremacy clause
only for this purpose. Furthermore, the Litvinov Assignment was an act of
recognition over which the President has exclusive constitutional control. It
is therefore possible that the Court, in a case involving an agreement regard-
ing a subject over which Congress also has control, would refuse to hold
such an agreement the "Law of the Land" capable of overriding a prior act of
Congress. 76
The restrictive view that, where constitutional powers are concurrent, Con-
gress may occupy the field by prior legislation may often result in highly
undesirable rigidity in the conduct of foreign affairs. It might therefore be
argued that, since Congress has power to override the domestic consequences
of presidential agreements, the President should in times of crisis possess a
reciprocal power within the areas of his concurrent constitutional compe-
tence. 77 Thus far there appears to be no conclusive answer to this question,
174. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-35 n.2 (1952) (concur-
ring opinion of Jackson). The commentators have been in general agreement. See, e.g.,
CoRwiN, THE PRESIDENT'S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIO.NS 120 (1917); Hearings before
Subcommittee of Senate Committee on the Judiciary o; SJ. Res. 1 & SJ. Res. 43, 83d
Cong., 1st sess. 224, 247 & n.57 (1953); MacChesney et al., The Treaty Pocr and the
Constitution: The Case Against Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. 203, 205 (1954). Lissitzyn
observes: "[W]hile a treaty, if self-e-xecuting, can supersede a prior inconsistent statute, it
is very doubtful whether an executive agreement, in the absence of appropriate legislation,
will be given similar effect." Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Execcutive Agreements on
Air Transportation, 17 J. AR. L & Comm. 436, 444 (1950).
175. Hearings, supra note 174, at 235.
176. Still, Presidential agreement, whether or not accompanied by any act of recogni-
tion, should properly override contrary state law. See text at notes 155-57 supra.
177. There appears to be no wholly satisfactory authority for this proposition. In
Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. (x.s.) 288 (1870), a case which is sometimes cited
in support of this conclusion, the court may have relied upon the doctrine of "political
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although the majority of commentators appears to take the restrictive view
and one judicial decision may be regarded as affording them some support. 17 8
However, neither policy nor logic may require this result. The balance be-
tween presidential and congressional powers should be worked out in a
manner essentially pragmatic. It might be desirable to conclude, as with
respect to treaties and congressional statutes, that the latest expression in
point of time prevails.
The question remaining, therefore, is what specific constitutional powers
does Congress possess for limiting the power of the President to conclude
international agreements. The answer must, of course, be in terms of con-
gressional power to restrict the President's substantive foreign affairs powers.
Principal among the powers conferred on Congress is the authority to sup-
port and to regulate the armed forces.179 Congress has sole control over all
appropriations for the support of the military, and through the budget it has
complete discretion in determining the size of the services. The President
may exhort, but he cannot control, the Congress, except insofar as he may
be able to force the legislative branch to meet his demands-or make up his
deficits-by committing the armed forces to action tinder his independent
powers. However, Congress cannot use its power of "government and regu-
lation" for the purpose of limiting the authority of the Commander in Chief
to use the armed forces in appropriate circumstances.180 Thus the Selective
Service Act of 1940 provided that troops drafted under the Act could be used
only in the Western Hemisphere and the territories of the United States.
But the President sent troops to Iceland without a reference to the Act, and
his action was never challenged. 8 1 So also, the Senate committee report, on
the assignment of American forces to European duty in implementation of
the North Atlantic Treaty, is careful to state that the suggested requirement
of congressional approval of any assignment of ground forces to Europe was
not "concerned with armed forces which the President might send abroad
under his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy."'8 2
questions" or even upon the presumed exclusive power of the President to settle boundary
disputes with foreign nations. See McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Exceu-
tive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YAtU
L.J. 181,318 & n.53 (1945).
178. This is the Steel Seiure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). However, this case may not be determinative of the issue, owing to the
impossibility of finding in the various opinions any clear constitutional theory to which
a majority of the Justices could agree. Moreover, despite its evident relationship to
foreign affairs, the issue involved in Youngstown was primarily of domestic concern.
179. U.S. Coxsr. art. 1, § 8.
180. "Congress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether;
but so long as we have military force Congress cannot take away from the President the,
supreme command." Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893), aff'd, 165 U.S.
553 (1897).
181. See REPORT oN POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 15.
182. SEN. REP. No. 175, 82d Cong., 1st sess. 8 (1951). To avoid the constitutional
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Congress may be able to use its authority to govern and regulate the armed
forces to restrict the power of the Commander in Chief in another way than
by limiting the military resources at his disposal. The President can use the
forces of the United States under his authority as Commander in Chief only
when such action is in the national interest. It has been argued that although
this constitutional power cannot be restricted by Congress under its authority
to govern and regulate the military, Congress can restrict the President in
his exercise of this power by defining more narrowly the "interests" of the
United States which the President may defend.183 This is said to be the
constitutional basis of various acts of Congress regulating the disposition of
military equipment in the years preceding the second World WVar.184 It has
been suggested that this legislation could have constitutionally prohibited the
President from sending over-age destroyers to Britain, not because the statutes
limited the scope of presidential power as such, but because they restricted
the interests for which the President's authority as Commander in Chief could
constitutionally be exercised. Conversely, the constitutional theory under-
lying the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 may have been not that Congress was
delegating power to the Commander in Chief, but that it was redefining the
defensible interests of the United States to include the defense of foreign
governments. As a matter of fact, of course, legislation limiting the exercise
of his power limits the President's power, for he is prevented from engaging
question and quiet the misnamed "Great Debate," the report provided for consultation
among various executive departments and "approval" of executive policy by Congress; but,
in effect, the requirement of "approval" amounted only to a suggestion for cooperation.
The debate had been precipitated by Senator Taft: "The President has no power to
agree to send troops to fight in Europe in a war between the members of the Atlantic
Pact and Soviet Russia. This matter must be debated and determined by Congress and
by the people of this country if we are to maintain any of our constitutional frecdoms."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1951, § IV, p. 1, col. 3. To give effect to this position, a resolution
was submitted by Senator Wherry, providing that "no ground forces of the United
States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North
Atlantic Treaty pending the formulation of a policy with respect theret'j by Congress."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1951, p. 1, col. 4. This position was strongly opposed by the admini-
stration, President Truman declaring that, although he would consult with congressional
committees, and would welcome a resolution of the Senate approving his action in sending
troops to Europe, he would be ultimately guided by the policy whichl he thought necessary
under the circumstances. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1951, p. 1, col. 5. Three months later
the Senate voted, 69 to 21, to approve the President's action in sending four additional
divisions to Europe, and expressed its opinion, without purporting to bind the President,
that Congress should have the right to approve any further shipment of troops to NATO.
N.Y. Times, April 5, 1951, p. 12, col. 2. Senator Taft voted in favor of this resolution.
183. See Wright, The Lend-Lease Bill and Intenatlonal Law, 35 A-I. J. INxr'L L
305 (1941).
184. Id. at 305 & n.5. The authorities are uniform in recognizing this power in Con-
gress to limit the authority of the Commander in Chief. See Acquisition of Naval & Air
Bases in Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 OPs. A'r'y Gn.z. 484 (1940); Wright,
Editorial Comment, 34 Am. J. Ii&'L L. 680 (1940); Briggs, Neglected Aspects of the
Destroyer Deal, 34 Am. J. INT'L L. 569 (1940).
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in various activities which would otherwise be within his authority as Com-
mander in Chief.
Although the President has exclusive power to direct the use of military
forces, Congress has often attempted to assert its influence. It has frequently
enacted neutrality legislation and embargoes on the shipment abroad of mili-
tary equipment. The constitutionality of these acts has not been questioned.
On the other hand, the President has ignored legislative attempts to restrict
his power to send troops abroad. And this action too has generally been
accepted as constitutional. The only distinction between these cases lies in
the extent to which they involved the interests of the United States. In terms
of the classic doctrine, the cases might be said to turn on whether our own
interests, or merely those of other nations, are affected. Thus it could be
argued that Congress cannot prevent the shipment of troops to Iceland be-
cause the President is acting in the interests of the United States, but that
Congress can prevent the shipment of arms to Britain because only Britain's
interest is involved. In reality, of course, the interests of the United States
are affected in both cases, and the only valid distinction is one of degree.
It appears, therefore, that where the interests of the United States are not
immediately threatened, Congress may be able constitutionally to limit the
President's power to act as Commander in Chief and, therefore, his ability
to make agreements in that capacity. But these restrictions are presumably
constitutional only if they leave to the President considerable freedom to
exercise his war powers in defense of the interests of the United States.
Neutrality acts have always given the President considerable discretion to
meet emergencies. And, "in the face of a real threat to the security of the
country the President would be justified in using his powers as Commander
in Chief to protect the United States, even in contravention of a duly en-
acted neutrality law .... ,,85 Which interests the President may defend in
disregard of a statute limiting his actions is a matter of fact to be determined
in each set of circumstances. And since the President has traditionally initi-
ated the foreign policy of the United States, he is the one who determines
what these interests are. This is an inevitable and indispensable consequence
of our form of government. It is not a case of the President enlarging his
power "at the expense of Congress by simply deciding that a national emer-
gency exists."'18  In foreign affairs it is necessary that the President "may
185. REPORT ON THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 20. Neutrality legislation is, of
course, a traditional and familiar exercise of the constitutional power of Congress to
declare war. Id. at 19. Customarily, the major effect of such legislation is to regulate
the conduct of private citizens of the United States when foreign war exists, rather than
to determine the international status of the United States as a nation. Nevertheless, it
may conflict with the international policies of the President.
186. See Schwarzer & Wood, Presidential Power and Aggression Abroad: A Consti.
tutioal Dilemnina, 40 A.B.A.J. 394, 395 (1954) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
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legitimately take action... which leaves Congress no alternative but to follow
the lead he has chosen to give. ' 187
The argument has been made that since the Constitution confers upon Con-
gress alone the power to declare war, the President is bound not to take any
action which will increase the danger of war, lest he thereby usurp the con-
gressional power by creating a situation in which Congress has no choice but
to declare war. This argument presupposes a sequence of events which might
possibly take place. But practical difficulties would prevent it from ever being
employed as a constitutional doctrine. It surpasses human competence to
isolate particular events which more than others may be said to have tended
towards war. Historians are often unable to agree upon this question even
in the perspective of centuries. It would be much less possible to make a
determination amid the political and emotional stresses of the moment. "There
is no constitutional doctrine to this effect, and there can be none if the Nation
is to survive."' 8 8
The President's power over the administration of foreign affairs
has always been recognized to be almost exclusive of congressional limita-
tion. However, there have been many attempts in Congress during our
history to encroach upon this presidential power; and though none of the
cases involved an international agreement, it is instructive to note that the
President emerged as victor in each of these contests. 189 For example, in
1826 an attempt was made to persuade Congress to impose its foreign policy
upon the President by attaching certain conditions to an appropriations bill
for the mission which the United States sent to the Panama Congress. How-
ever, Webster argued that the conditions were an unconstitutional invasion
of the power of the President, and that the proper manner of expressing
congressional disapproval was by resolution or by refusing the appropriation
altogether. The conditions were stricken from the bill. In 1864 the House,
despite arguments that its action expressed a novel theory of administration
of foreign affairs, approved a resolution that the President ought, as a con-
stitutional matter, to recognize that Congress possesses "an authoritative
voice" in the formulation of foreign policy. However, similar resolutions in
the Senate never reached a vote. And in 1876 President Grant vetoed an
innocuous congressional resolution requesting the Secretary of State to ex-
press thanks to Argentina and the Republic of Pretoria for their congratula-
tions on the first centennial of American independence. With an overdose of
caution but a probably correct view of the Constitution, the President feared
that this suggestion could be construed as an invasion of his power. Thus,
the power of Congress has been limited to the offering of suggestions regard-
ing the conduct of our foreign policy.
The President exercises a nearly unlimited power in the recognition of
187. See LASKi, THE AmMUcAN PPRasisExc 171 (1940).
18. RXcRT ON THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT 18.
189. These examples are drawn from CoRwix, THE PREsmENT's CONTroL OF FU:MsGN
RELATIoNS 40-46 (1917).
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other governments. 190 In 1818 an appropriations bill was introduced to finance
a minister to "the United Provinces of the Rio de La Plata" at the Presi-
dent's discretion. Even though it was argued that this merely expressed the
opinion of Congress and in no way sought to dictate the President's recog-
nition policy, the bill was defeated and nothing further was done in the matter
until the President specifically invited congressional action four years later.
President Jackson left the recognition of Texas to Congress "on the ground
of expediency," but stated that his action was not to be regarded as an ex-
yression of opinion on the constitutional issue. And when a bill was intro-
duced to provide a salary for a minister to Texas, the adjective was stricken
from "independent Republic of Texas" for it was thought to usurp presiden-
tial prerogative. Again, despite strong congressional sentiment, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations concluded that it would be unconstitutional
to pass a joint resolution directing the President to recognize the indepen-
dence of Cuba. A subsequent resolution referring to Cuba as "independent"
was approved only after the President had appealed to Congress to settle the
Cuban problem. These few events indicate the long recognized incapacity of
Congress to limit the President's power of recognition.
In the recent Capps case, 191 a presidential agreement regulating the im-
portation of potatoes was invalidated by the Fourth Circuit on the ground that
the agreement contravened prior congressional legislation under the commerce
clause. 192 Capps presents, however, a less than satisfactory treatment of the
constitutional question. First, it is not even clear that the method of presi-
dential action provided by Congress was intended to be exclusive. Another
190. Examples are from id. at 73-82.
191. United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.), cert. grantcd,
346 U.S. 884 (1953).
192. Since it has been said that this case demonstrates the power of Congress to limit
the President's independent authority to make international agreements, its facts are worth
noting. In 1948 the President entered into an agreement with Canada, Control of Exports
from Canada, Nov. 23, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1896, for the purpose of preventing the im-
portation from that country of table stock potatoes. Canada undertook to refuse export
permits of all table stock potatoes intended for the United States, and to issue permits for
seed potatoes only on showing that they were destined for a locality in which there was
a "legitimate demand," and only upon proof, in the form of a provision in the contract
with the American importer, that the potatoes would not be diverted for consumption
purposes. At the time this agreement was made, Congress had already provided legislation
dealing with the problem. The Agricultural Act of 1948, 62 STAT. 1247 (1948), 7 U.S.C.
§ 624 (1952) authorized the President, if the importation of Canadian potatoes appeared
to be undermining the American market, to order an investigation by the Tariff Com-
mission and, if in his opinion the Commission's report warranted, to impose limitations
of up to 50% upon the quantity of potatoes imported. The Act did not authorize the
President to proceed in any other way. The question presented to the court was whether
the United States could maintain an action for damages for the breach by an American
importer of the provision in his contract required by the presidential agreement, by which
he agreed not to resell imported potatoes for table stock. There was a sufficient showing
of damages occasioned by defendant's breach of contract: the United States purchased
all table stock potatoes which American growers and dealers were unable to sell at parity,
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section of the Act in question may be interpreted to show a congressional
intent to permit the President to deal with the problem by means of executive
agreement as well.193 More important, the decision does not clearly recog-
nize the question whether the President possesses any independent power
in the commerce field. If he does not, the issue is only the extent to which
Congress has delegated its own powers to the President to deal with a sub-
ject solely within congressional competence, and no question of the authority
of Congress to limit the President's independent powers is involved. The
Fourth Circuit's opinion contains statements supporting both the proposition
that the President has no independent power, and its converse.1 4 If he does
possess independent power to act in this field, but if the method established
by Congress was intended to be exclusive, the power of the President to
follow a different procedure should depend upon judicial appraisal of the
degree of emergency eliciting his action. If the context of events indicates
that there was not sufficient time for the President to have used the method
prescribed by Congress, then he might be held to have had constitutional
sanction unilaterally to override the legislation. Whatever the ultimate dis-
position of the Capps case, the decision shows a desire on the part of the
courts to review presidential agreements in appropriate circumstances.
Far more sweeping than the reasoning in Capps is another argument ad-
vanced by those who wish to limit the power of the President to conduct
foreign affairs. Under the necessary and proper clause 105 Congress is said
to possess power to regulate presidential agreements of all t3pes. 90  The
argument runs as follows: the President's power is wholly derived from the
Constitution; the Constitution confers on Congress the power to make all
laws "necessary and proper" to carry out not only its own constitutional
and the diversion of defendant's potatoes to the consumption market had pro tanto in-
creased the quantity of potatoes which the United States was obliged to purchmse. The
fourth circuit nevertheless held that there could be no recovery, on the ground that
the presidential agreement was invalid.
193. See Sutherland, The Bricker Amenident, Executive Agreenents, and Imported
Potatoes, 67 H.Iv. L. REv. 281, 291 (1953).
194. "The power to regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, not in the
executive ... and the executive may not exercise the power by entering into executive
agreements.. . ." United States v. Guy XV. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1953).
See also id. at 659. But "whatever the power of the executive with respect to maling
executive trade agreements regulating foreign commerce in the absence of action by
Congress, it is clear that the executive may not through entering into such an agreement
avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by Congress." Id. at 659-60.
195. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
196. "It seems clear that the necessary and proper clause vests Congress with the
power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry the executive power into effect;
and that Congress can, therefore, under the existing Constitution, regulate e.xecutive
agreements." Statement by A. J. Schweppe, Hearings before Subcommitlee of Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on SJ Res. 1 & SJ. Res. 43, 83d Cong., Ist sess. 66 (1953).
See also id. at 43; Hatch et al, The Treaty Power and the Conltitution: The Case for
Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. 207, 259 (1954).
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powers but-by the language of that clause-those of the President as well;
therefore Congress has legislative control over all the powers possessed by the
President, and since the President cannot contravene validly existing legis-
lation, Congress has power to regulate all presidential agreements.
It is hard to envision a way to do greater violence to the necessary and
proper clause. The purpose of the clause is to make possible the effectiveness
of the powers which the Constitution confers upon the various branches of
the Government, by authorizing Congress to legislate for this purpose in
areas where it is otherwise without power. The very presence of the necessary
and proper clause is proof that Congress does not otherwise possess power
to legislate in these areas. If Congress had that power, the clause would be
superfluous. Congress may refuse to pass implementing legislation under
the necessary and proper clause and thus frustrate the effectiveness of a
presidential agreement. But this does not mean that the clause gives Congress
independent power to legislate in every case in which it is enabled by this
provision to pass implementing legislation supported by the powers of another
branch of the government. Such an interpretation would violate the funda-
mental principle of balanced powers upon which our government was built.
It may in conclusion be recalled that Congress is not without power to limit
the effectiveness of presidential agreements even in areas to which its own
powers of legislation do not extend. We have seen that Congress can limit the
effective exercise of the constitutional powers of the President by refusing
appropriations or necessary legislation. Furthermore, so long as the safety
of the United States is not endangered, Congress has power to limit the size
and disposition of the armed forces, with a consequent inhibiting effect upon
the President's power to take military action. Similarly, subject to the same
condition, Congress may apparently define the territory, 107 nations, and
individuals which it is in the interest of the United States to defend, again
limiting the President's exercise of his power as Commander in Chief. Never-
theless, the President, by virtue of his position as the initiator of foreign policy,
is in a position in many cases to define what are the interests of the United
States in furtherance of which he may exercise his constitutional authority.
In addition to these various legal controls possessed by Congress, purely
practical considerations are customarily effective in preventing extreme at-
tempts by the President to formulate the foreign policy of the United States
in disregard of Congress. 98 Obviously some Administrations are more re-
sponsive to congressional opinion than others; but no President who expects
to see his program carried into effect can afford to ignore the legislature. 0
197. RoGERs, WORLD POLICING & THE CONSTITUTION 89 (1945), states that Congress
can limit the President's use of the armed forces "in almost any way, such as to areas,
for example." It would seem that this states the proposition too broadly.
198. The Senate possesses an incidental control over the activities of the President by
virtue of its power to refuse consent to the appointment of various important subordinates.
199. "In the interest of orderly procedure . . .I feel that the Congress is entitled to
know the considerations that enter into the determinations as to which procedures [execu-
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These congressional controls, in part based upon the language of the Con-
stitution and in part stemming from deference to Congress' political power,
should be sufficient to quell any fears that the independent authority of the
President to conclude international agreements is not presently subject to
adequate supervision..2 0 0 There is no need to indulge in fantasies of constitu-
tional theory in an effort to interpret the necessary and proper clause to
create a primary congressional function where the Constitution gives the
President, but not Congress, a power to act. The experience of recent years
has shown that the United States must be capable of prompt and sometimes
secret action as an indispensable condition of survival. Plainly, this necessity
may increase. Secrecy may often be required to negotiate defensive agreements
with our allies, and speed and singleness of purpose to counteract sudden
aggression. If the Executive does not possess powers adequate for these
occasions, no branch of government does. Our Constitution affords a wise
compromise of function whereby leadership in dealing with foreign nations
rests with the President, subject to constitutional restrictions and legislative
powers vested in Congress. It would be extremely unwise to destroy the
balancing of power effected by the Founding Fathers and to restrict the Presi-
dent further by strained interpretation of an inapplicable clause or by the
rigidity and permanence of a constitutional amendment.
tive agreement or treaty] are sought to be followed." Statement by Secretary of State
Dulles, Hearings, supra note 196, at 82-29.
200. The recent statement by Secretary of State Duiles that "the Suprene Court
has repeatedly held in the field of current conduct of foreign relations that the President
is paramount, not subject to interference by Congress," Hearings, supra note lh, at 892.
if intended to deny the existence of the various legislative controls outlined above, is
dearly inaccurate.
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